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How Free Is Speech at Work?
Mary Becker*
INTRODUcTION©
Free speech challenges to Title VII regulation are a recent
development although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
banning discrimination on the basis of sex in employment, has
been on the books for over two decades and charges involving
harassing speech have been recognized for decades. Only a few
lower courts have considered such challenges to date.
In this Article, I do assume that Title VII's prohibition of
racial and sexual harassment does raise First Amendment con-
cerns. The initial question, as always under the First Amend-
ment, is which set of cases is applicable. If the cases setting
standards for general governmental regulation of speech on the
basis of content are applicable, then the Free Speech Clause
likely places severe limits on the scope of Title VII's ban on
sexually harassing speech at work. Thus, if the fighting words
doctrine and similar stringent limitations on speech regulation
apply, the permissible scope of Title VII regulation is likely to
be exceedingly narrow. There are, however, many First Amend-
ment doctrines and cases far more tolerant of restrictions on
speech.'
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the Nexus Between Speech and Religion, Abortion, and Equality for helpful comments on an
earlier version of this essay. I also thank Paul Bryan, Shirley Evans, Connie Fleischer, Jac-
queline Guynn, Ruth Halibey, Carol Jones, Kormey Kloppe, Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Amy
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I THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND POR-
NOGRAPHY 3, 6-7 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE PRICE
WE PAY]. These restrictions on speech include:
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The cases most similar to Title VII's prohibition of harass-
ment are, I believe, those involving regulation of workplace
speech. The American workplace is not in general an arena of
protected speech. Private employers are free to fire employees
for disfavored speech and often do. Although much speech and
much political speech takes place on the job, it is unprotected.
For example, most lesbians and gay men are closeted at work
because of fear of adverse reactions to "out" speech.
Neither Congress nor the electorate has viewed private em-
ployment as an important enough arena of free speech to war-
rant protection. For example, Title VII bans discrimination on
the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin, and color but
not discrimination on the basis of speech, even political speech.
Congress has never even considered extending such protection
to speech in private employment, nor has there ever been pres-
sure from voters for such an extension. Indeed, much of what
regulation there is consists of content-based limits on speech in
private employment. For example, labor law prohibits certain
employer speech during union elections and much employee
speech. Antitrust law also restricts employment and market-relat-
ed speech.
There is some constitutional protection of employee speech
and association-rights in public employment, but that protection
has been limited by the Supreme Court. Public employers can-
[S]peech used to form a criminal conspiracy, speech that disseminates an offi-
cial secret, speech that defames or libels someone .... speech that violates a
trademark or plagiarizes another's words, speech that creates a clear and pres-
ent danger (for instance, shouting fire in a crowded theater), speech used to
defraud a consumer, speech used to fix prices, speech used to communicate a
criminal threat (for example, "stick 'em up"), untruthful or irrelevant speech
given under oath or during a trial, and disrespectful words aimed at a judge or
a military officer.
Id.
I can easily think of others: limits on what jurors can talk about, hear, or read during
a trial and countless rules and practices regulating and rewarding or penalizing certain
kinds of speech in public universities. For a discussion of the many ways in which public
universities routinely regulate speech, see Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Un-
easy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 1033-39 (1993). Other examples in-
clude: ethical limits on what lawyers, doctors, and other fiduciaries and professionals can
reveal about their clients; speech likely to be unduly prejudicial to a criminal defendant in
light of its probative value; speech that is hearsay and barred by rules of evidence for that
reason; and much other speech.
[Vol. 29:815
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not fire non-policy making employees in order to replace them
with their own loyal patronage workers.2 Policy-making employ-
ees can, however, be fired for belonging to the "wrong" political
party. In addition, public employers can prohibit much political
speech and activity by public employees and censor employee
speech in viewpoint-specific ways when disfavored speech im-
pedes efficient governmental operations, as it often does.'
Thus, even if the Constitution were to protect speech in pri-
vate employment to the extent it is protected in public employ-
ment, speech, even political speech of employees, would be
protected only to a very limited extent. But perhaps greater
constitutional protection is warranted when government requires
private employers to regulate speech that harasses on the basis
of sex or race. Such regulation will affect many more workers
than government regulation of public employees' speech and
the government cannot justify its regulation by the need to
ensure efficient governmental operations.
The Supreme Court has, however, allowed government to
censor even political speech in private employment in content-
specific ways under the labor laws. It has also shown a similar
tolerance for antitrust regulation of speech related to the
workplace and even to restrictions of political activities by public
employees. There appears to be an emerging category in which
content-specific regulation is tolerated under fairly lax standards
- governmental regulation of workplace speech.'
A number of commentators have discussed issues raised by
Title VII's prohibition on sexual harassment. In early cases,
courts had declined to recognize sexual behavior or speech as
sex discrimination.5 In Sexual Harassment of Working Women,
' Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
519-20 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976).
' Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 384-88 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-54 (1983); United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
99-104 (1947).
' Richard Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That
Didn't Bark 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12.
' See, e.g., Come v. Bausch &.Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(holding if Title VII prohibited sexual advances, only asexual employees would fall outside
scope), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Catharine MacKinnon explained how sexual conduct or speech
can be discrimination on the basis of sex in employment set-
tings.6 MacKinnon described how sexual harassment systematical-
ly harms women and benefits men in the workplace, contribut-
ing in important ways to the lack of equal employment opportu-
nities on the basis of sex. Since then, many others have de-
scribed the harm done by sexual harassment7 and criticized
specific aspects of emerging doctrines.' More recently, a num-
ber of commentators have debated the meaning of the "reason-
ableness" requirement.'
6 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 59 (1979).
See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991). Estrich generally
evaluates the scope of sexual harassment, citing a 1976 Redbook study in which 9 out of 10
readers said they had been victims of unwanted sexual attention at work from male bosses
or colleagues, and 75% of them claimed it was "embarrassing, demeaning or intimidating."
Id. at 821 (citing Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual
Harassmen REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149). For other discussions of the harm caused by
sexual harassment to women and how it benefits men, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimi-
nation and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989); Morrison
Torrey, We Get The Message: Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 53 (1992).
' See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 7, at 831. The difficulties of proof, with regard to
welcomeness, for example, are huge because it is empirically clear that women usually do
not reveal sexual harassment, even to friends. Id. at 829. Courts have assumed that the lack
of a complaint reveals ambivalence, yet one rarely witnesses women testifying to this ambiv-
alence on the stand. Id. at 830.
' For example, a number of commentators have considered whether the reasonable-
ness requirement should focus on whether a reasonable woman, rather than a reasonable
person, would find that harassment posed a significant problem. See, e.g., Eileen M.
Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and the Case for Subjectivity, 16
VT. L. REV. 1005, 1005-06 (1992) (arguing for wholly subjective standard); Martha
Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Ha-
rassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 122-23 (1992) (noting advantage of reason-
able woman standard as giving more weight to perspective of victim); Estrich, supra note 7,
at 846 (arguing that courts' definitions of "reasonable" women vary, are inconsistent and
even genderless). Cf Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet
Title VI: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370 (1994) (arguing, inter alia, for
greater weight to be given to victim's perspective); Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1198
(1990) (noting that "reasonableness" - whether reasonable person, reasonable man, or
reasonable woman - tends to hide value judgments by presenting conclusion as neutral
and objective).
In a recent article, Professor Gillian K. Hadfield used economic analysis to argue that
harassment should be regarded as actionable under Title VII "whenever it would lead a
hypothetical rational woman to alter her employment decisions if she could do so at little
or no cost." Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1151, 1151 (1995).
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Recent articles have also begun to explore First Amendment
issues, questioning the initial assumption that Title VII regula-
tion does not raise First Amendment concerns. In a 1990 article,
Jack Balkin noted that the First Amendment had not been used
much as a defense in Title VII harassment cases "due to an
unconscious form of categorization - that speech in the
workplace is not considered speech in the same sense as politi-
cal or expressive speech generally, but is thought to be utilitari-
an, pedestrian, and incidental to the performance of work." 1°
After an extremely brief discussion of the issue, Balkin conclud-
ed that censorship of harassing speech at work should be per-
missible because "[flew audiences are more captive than the
average worker." "
In a 1991 article, Kingsley Browne disagreed, arguing that the
First Amendment should limit Title VII's scope with respect to
verbal harassment. 2 Browne stressed the need to avoid vague
rules chilling speech, particularly in the workplace where, he
asserted, most Americans engage in political speech. He then
proposed that Title VII plaintiffs should not be able to use alle-
gations about speech to establish discrimination, except in limit-
ed cases to prove that the motive was racial or sexual discrimina-
tion.
Other commentators have supported the line the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) seemed about to draw in the late
eighties: Title VII's ban on harassment should reach only speech
targeted at a specific woman. Thus, pornographic pictures and
offensive jokes should not be actionable if not directed at specif-
ic individuals.'" A number of commentators have argued in
to Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-
ment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 423.
" Id. See also, Estrich, supra note 7, at 846. Estrich argues that women stay in hostile
work environments because of economic necessity, and therefore it cannot be seen as truly
voluntary. Id. Estrich also argues that the market does not protect women from such harass-
ment. Id. at 847.
" Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 481-84 (1991).
" Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 43 (1990);
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment -
Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757, 762-64 (1992); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1857-63 (1992).
1996]
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general for broader First Amendment protection of public 4
and private 5 employees.
However, other commentators have agreed with Balkin. In a
1991 comment, Amy Horton argued that Title VII's prohibition
on harassment should be constitutional just as labor law regula-
tions of employers' speech are constitutional."6 Richard Fallon
also emphasized labor law limits on employers' speech, 7 as well
as a number of other First Amendment categories in which
content regulation has been permitted. 8 Fallon argued that
Title VII should be limited only by two exceptions: (1) speech
or expressive conduct "reasonably designed or intended to con-
tribute to reasoned debate on issues of public concern"; 9 and
14 See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 563-92 (1970) (argu-
ing for broader speech rights for public employees by protecting even disruptive speech if
directed at public and by regarding limits on political activities of public employees as
unconstitutional); Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that public
employees' speech should be protected - as long as not disruptive - regardless of wheth-
er judges regard speech as matter of public interest); Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences:
Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987) (suggesting elimi-
nation of public interest requirement for protected public employee speech and support-
ing imposition of greater obligation on public employer to show that speech will cause
harm).
15 Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First Amendment as
Public Policy for Wrongfid Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341 (1994) (arguing that private
employees' speech should be protected under same standard as that used for public
employees' speech); Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903 (1994) (arguing that there should be constitu-
tional protection for some secondary boycotts by unions, particularly when speech raises
issues of sexual or racial equality).
"6 Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment,
the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 424 (1991).
'" Fallon, like Balkin, stresses the special nature of the workplace and the limited scope
of free expression, but distinguishes his position from Balkin's by rejecting "captive audi-
ence" as a coherent doctrine. Fallon, supra note 4, at 18-19. Thus, Fallon sees his approach
as based on a different standard for regulation of speech in the workplace. It is not, howev-
er, clear that Balkin would disagree.
" The categories are the following: commercial speech, sexually-explicit non-obscene
speech, labor law limits on employer speech during union elections, public employees'
speech, "private" speech, libel, broadcast media speech, student speech, speech in non-
public fora, government-sponsored speech, overbreadth challenges to speech (degree of
scrutiny for overbreadth depends on content of speech), and election regulation. See id. at
23-28.
" Id. at 47 (quoting from draft Guidelines Concerning Sexual Harassment developed
by Harvard Law School Committee on Sexual Harassment, which Fallon chaired, presented
to Harvard Law School faculty in May 1994).
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(2) constitutionally protected materials, i.e. pornography, in the
workplaces in which the material is produced.
2 1
Like Balkin and Horton, I argue that the scope of Title VII's
ban on sexual harassment should be a question of statutory
construction. I thus break with Fallon's exceptions which are
constitutionally based. Furthermore, I consider a broader range
of employment-related cases than either Horton or Fallon. But
both my analysis and conclusion have much in common with
the articles of Balkin, Horton, and Fallon. These articles view
workplace speech as a category for which First Amendment
scrutiny has been and should be limited.
I begin by describing developments under Title VII, tracing
the courts' recognition of the discriminatory harm done by ra-
cial, and later sexual, harassment under the assumption that
Title VII is not limited by the First Amendment. I then describe
the recent challenges questioning that assumption. In Part II, I
discuss free speech and private employment apart from the Title
VII issue, noting that employees have no protected rights to
speak in private employment, and that labor law regulates
speech in content-specific ways in private employment without
violating the Free Speech Clause. Antitrust law also limits em-
ployment-related speech in content-based ways.
In Part III, I describe the limited scope of constitutional pro-
tection of speech in public employment. Public employers are
bound by the First Amendment of the Constitution; public em-
ployees therefore have some protection against employer retalia-
tion for disfavored speech. But this protection is quite limited.
Indeed, when this standard is applied to public employer limits
on sexually or racially harassing speech, such regulation does
not violate the Constitution.
In Part IV, I consider whether, under the Constitution, Title
VII can require private employers to regulate harassing speech. I
conclude that the Constitution can be interpreted as allowing
such an interpretation of Title VII. In Part V, I consider wheth-
er concern for women's equality might in fact cut in favor of
constitutional limits, since Title VII regulation might reinforce
"Id. at 50.
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notions that women need protection, particularly from sexually
explicit speech.
In this Article, I only consider whether Title VII's ban on
racially or sexually harassing speech, speech that creates an
objectively hostile or abusive environment," is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. Far more complicated issues are
often raised when a plaintiff alleges religious harassment, since
one person's expression of faith, protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, can be religious harassment to another.2 I do not,
however, address the difficult question of what forms of religious
expression Title VII can constitutionally prohibit in order to
protect listeners from religious harassment.2 -
Nor do I consider the broad normative question of the ideal
level of protection for worker speech in private and public em-
ployment. Rather, I accept the general contours of protection
and nonprotection in law today and ask how, in light of this
current reality, the new issue of free speech as a defense under
Title VII claims should be resolved. If we were to radically re-
structure workers' rights in the United States tomorrow, my
analysis might no longer apply. I doubt, however, that we will
see any great expansion of workers' rights for some time to
come.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF RACIAL AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
When Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, supporters and opponents saw it as regulating conduct -
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin
or color. The initial Title VII enforcement focus was on race,
and the first suits alleging harassment involved racial harass-
ment. Since the early seventies, the EEOC has ruled that use of
racially derogatory terms (particularly "nigger") in the workplace
" See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (relating use of objective "hostile and
abusive environment" standard in Harris case).
' See Douglas Laycock, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Adminis-
trative Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate (June 4,
1994).
" It seems likely that some state courts have gone to unconstitutional lengths. See, e.g.,
Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 578 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)
(banning articles on religion in private entity's company newsletter and printing of Bible
verses on company checks).
[Vol. 29:815
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violates Tide VII.24 When such cases reached the courts, they
have agreed.5
A. Racial Harassment
I illustrate this development - and the centrality of speech to
the creation of racially hostile workplaces - with two cases. The
first is a 1980 case from the district court in Minnesota, EEOC v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines.26 In that case, Ray Wells, an African
American, alleged that he was racially harassed by other workers
while working as a dockman at a truck terminal. Freight within
the terminal moved on carts with blackboards about one-foot
square which often carried messages such as: "Ray Wells is a
nigger," "[t]he only good nigger is a dead nigger," "Ray Wells is
a mother," "[S]end all blacks back to Africa," and "[n]iggers
[or, on other occasions, Ray Wells] are [is] a living example
that the Indians screwed Buffalo." 7 In the lunchroom, other
employees placed licorice dolls on the table with derogatory
notes attached." When Wells and another African American
began eating lunch elsewhere, the door to that room was la-
beled "niggers only" and "nigger lunchroom."' Employees post-
ed derogatory articles about African Americans on the bulletin
board, and they wrote racially-negative messages on restroom
walls and near the loading dock. The threat of violence implicit
in such harassment was palpable, as employees slashed Wells's
tires and placed a foul-smelling substance in Wells's shoes.'
24 EEOC Dec. 72-0957, 4 F.E.P. Cas. 837 (1972) (stating manager's ethnic jokes and
use of "nigger" violates Title VII); EEOC Dec. 72-0779, 4 F.E.P. Cas. 317 (1971) (discussing
supervisor's reference to employee as "nigger" as Title VII violation); EEOC Dec. 71-2598, 4
F.E.P. Cas. 21 (1971) (holding employer liable for toleration of co-workers' racial jokes and
for atmosphere where customers and other workers avoided African-American employee);
EEOC Dec. 71-909, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 269 (1970) (noting supervisor's use of "niggers" to refer
to African-American employees).
Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D.N.Y 1985) (noting much of ha-
rassment consisted of speech, cartoons, etc., often directed at no particular minority em-
ployee, such as cartoon in which depicting "a Ku Klux Klan member who after shooting a
Black person remarks to a Ranger 'Whatcha mean, 'Out of Season'?'"); EEOC v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980).
488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385 (quoting Wells's testimony).
29 Id.
30 Id.
82319961
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Snell v. Suffolk County is a second example of racial harass-
ment.' Plaintiffs were sixteen African American and Hispanic
employees of the Sheriffs Department of Suffolk County, New
York. They held jobs as a correction officer, a sergeant, or a
lieutenant, and they worked in the jail. The trial judge found
that "plaintiffs have been subject to continuing verbal and other
abuse.""2  For example, many cartoons and other written
messages were posted on official bulletin boards or in other
places where minority officers would see them. The court
described a number of these communications in some detail:
Exhibit 9 purports to be a study guide for a special minority
police officer civil service examination. The "guide" consists
of [puzzles] and games such as "which one is different?"
commonly found in playbooks for five-year-olds, except that
one of the puzzles has a distinctively racist cast. ("How many
Honkies are in this picture?") Exhibit 10 is a cartoon depict-
ing a Ku Klux Klan member who after shooting a Black per-
son remarks to a ranger, "Whatcha mean, 'Out of Season'?"
Names familiar to jail employees have been attached to the
figures .... Exhibit 11 is a highly offensive depiction of a
large-breasted Black woman in some form of native garb; in
the same vein, Exhibit 12 is a national geographic magazine-
type photograph of a naked Black woman with the words "Yo
Mama" and a bone added above her head. Exhibit 13 also
depicts a naked Black person, this time accompanied by the
words "Official Runnin' Nigger Target" and what appear to
be bullet holes. Exhibit 14 is a questionnaire that begins
"Photo not necessary since you all look alike" and asks such
questions as "[how many] years [spent] in local prisons?" and
"[give] approximate estimate of income [from] theft, wel-
fare .... false insurance claims . . . ." Finally, Exhibit 38 is a
photograph from the first page of the Suffolk Federal Credit
Union "News n Views" of newly elected credit officers. One is
a Black man; the other four have been altered to resemble
Ku Klux Klan members. The cumulative intent of these car-
toons, "jokes" and pictures is clear.3
', 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
I& ld. at 525. Plaintiffs also claimed to have been discriminated against in job
assignments but the trial judge found that they had not proven such discrimination. Id. at
524.
" Id. at 525.
824 [Vol. 29:815
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Within the jail, African American officers were routinely referred
to as "nigger," and one received a Ku Klux Klan application."
The trial judge held that these "vicious and demeaning" re-
marks and material were "designed to demean, harass, and in-
timidate." 5 The Warden was ordered to:
[F]orbid the use by correction officers on any County prop-
erty and on all County business of: (1) epithets such as
"nigger," "pollack," "kike," "spic," "guinea," "honky," "mick,"
"coon," and "black bitch" (all of which have been used on
the job by correction officers in recent years); (2) posting or
distribution of derogatory bulletins, cartoons and other writ-
ten material; (3) mimicking officers because of what some
correction officers may believe to be stereotypical characteris-
tics of minorities; and (4) any racial, ethnic, or religious slurs
whether in the form of 'jokes," 'jests," or otherwise. 6
Again, the physical safety of the minority officers was at risk.
"White officers" had been avoiding one of the plaintiffs, Ramos,
because of "his frequent complaints of racial harassment."3 7 Of-
ten, the trial court found, Ramos did "not receive the full coop-
eration of [w]hite officers, making his job more dangerous and
stressful. On one occasion, the security squad took so long to
respond to Ramos's call for help that he was assaulted. " ' The
trial judge reported that "plaintiffs have felt humiliated, fearful
and depressed on the job" 9 and held that the employer had
violated Title VII by failing to "take reasonable steps to prevent
the racial harassment." 40
Fear for one's own physical safety is a common reaction to
racial harassment and doubtless present in both the Murphy
freight terminal and the Suffolk County jail. But stop and imag-
ine the other feelings an African American employee would
have going in to work: humiliation, embarrassment, shame, low
" Id. at 526.
Id. at 529.
'6 Id. at 531-32. The Warden was also ordered to do a number of other things, includ-
ing announce the new policy in the terms described in text to an assembly of the officers
and explain that violation of the policy would result "in prompt and severe discipline." Id.
at 532.
'7 Id. at 526.
38 Id.
Id. at 528.
'o Id. at 527.
1996] 825
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self-esteem, and a feeling of being trapped in an unbearable
situation because of the need to earn a living for one's self and
for one's family. One would feel invisible as an individual hu-
man being, visible only as a type representative of all one's race.
Imagine the difficulty of trying to do one's job well in such
situations. Imagine how distracted one would be by fear and
other complicated emotions making it difficult to concentrate
and perform successfully.
Such working conditions discriminate; in such workplaces,
minority employees must work in environments far more hostile
than those of their white co-workers. One's "working conditions"
depended on one's race, both at the Murphy freight terminal
and at the Suffolk County jail.4'
Abuse puts individual employees in an impossible "catch 22":
whether to go along and appear to acquiesce in the judgment
of her or his inferiority or to complain, thus identifying oneself
as a troublemaker and calling attention to oneself in a way that
might provoke further and even worse abuse. Anxiety about how
to respond and how to hide one's actual feelings wastes time
and energy, leading to lower productivity and more errors. In
addition, abusive environments often have the purpose and
effect of keeping desirable jobs all white, thus denying employ-
ment opportunities on the basis of race.
B. Sexual Harassment
Despite a great deal of similarity between the racial harass-
ment cases and sexual harassment cases, the courts were initially
reluctant to recognize sexual harassment by co-workers as dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, particularly when the harass-
ment involved sexuality and speech about sex. Courts tended to
regard sexual advances and harassment as beyond the scope of
" Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 29:815
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congressional intent, 2 not the company's responsibility because
not required by explicit corporate policy,43 or based on inter-
personal attraction and desire rather than the sex of the target
as such." Eventually, between 1975 and 1979 or so, courts
came to recognize sexual harassment as analogous to racial
harassment and actionable under Title VII.
Two kinds of sexual harassment cases emerged: quid pro quo
and hostile environment. In quid pro quo cases, a supervisor
makes compliance with sexual requests a condition of employ-
ment. 5 Free speech has not been used as a defense in these
cases.
Hostile environment cases involving sex are often much like
those involving race.' Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 17 is
illustrative and quite similar to the cases involving racial harass-
ment described above. Lois Robinson was a welder at Jackson-
ville Shipyards, one of the few women working in skilled craft
positions.' On a shift of fifty to one hundred people, there
might be only one or two women, according to a welding
"' Given that "sex" was added as a floor amendment to Title VII's list of proscribed
forms of discrimination, it seems most likely that few, if any, members of Congress
consciously considered whether Title VII would, or would not, reach sexual harassment. See
CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES 1945-1968,
176-82 (1988) (describing how "sex" was added to Title VII).
See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding no relief under Civil Rights Act for verbal and physical
sexual abuse where no employer policy addressed such conduct).
See Barnes v. Train, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding no violation of Tide
VII where supervisor asked subordinate for sex because he found her attractive and
retaliated against her because she rejected him), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (holding employer not liable under Title VII "for what is essentially the isolated and
unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to another"), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979). For a discussion of other reasons for the courts' initial reluctance to find sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII, see BARaARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 10-142 (1992) (mentioning other factors such as
bias on part of male-dominated judiciary and fear of deluge of litigation).
4' LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 44.
4 Sarah Bums argues that sexual harassment is perhaps more oppressive due to the
social norms against racism that do not similarly apply to sexism. Sarah E. Burns, Issues in
Wor*place Sexual Harassment Law and Related Social Science Research, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 193, 197
(1995).
4' 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
As of 1986, the last year for which the district court reported numbers, there were 6
women and 846 men in skilled craft positions. Id. at 1493.
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leadsman.49 Thus, a woman in a craft position was often the
only woman in an all-male group when on duty on a particular
task. Again, physical safety was at risk. There is danger in ship
repair work. Welders faced particular risks, particularly when
working with others, because "'one slip' could lead to someone
getting hurt."5"
The shipyard was filled with pornographic images of women,
in part because workers received calendars full of such pictures
from suppliers and were allowed to display them, although prior
approval of the company was required for posting other materi-
al.5" Managers indicated that nude pictures of men were never
displayed and that if someone were to display such pictures, they
would be disallowed. For example, a foreman stated he "would
probably throw such a calendar in the trash." 2 In the past, the
company had "denied employees' requests to post political mate-
rials, advertisements and commercial materials."" Employees
were not supposed to bring or read magazines, but nevertheless
"read pornographic magazines in the workplace without appar-
ent sanctions" and were allowed to post pictures from such
magazines and to draw similar graffiti.' Management often
posted their own pictures from such magazines or calendars.5
For example, women at the shipyard saw "drawings and graffi-
ti on the walls, including a drawing depicting a frontal view of a
nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on
it";' "a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula
pressed on it";57 "a dart board with a drawing of a woman's
breast with her nipple as the bull's eye";5  as well as many Play-
boy centerfold type shots throughout the ship yard. Pornographic
pictures were repeatedly put in Robinson's toolbox. 9
49 Id.
' Id. at 1492 (quoting deposition of Mcllwain who was President of defendant
corporation).
5' Id. at 1494.
52 Id. (quoting deposition of defendant Lovett who was shopfitting foreman).
53 Id.
Id.
5 Id.
Id. at 1495.
57 Id.
Id. at 1497.
59 Id.
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Men routinely directed pornography, sexual comments, and
jokes at women in the shipyards. For example, Robinson report-
ed hearing: "'Hey pussycat, come here and give me a whiff"';'
"It]he more you lick it the harder it gets";6' "'[b]lack women
taste like sardines"; 62 "'women are only fit company for some-
thing that howls"'; 63 and "'there's nothing worse than having to
work around women."'64 Once when Robinson was welding in
an enclosed area with about six men, one of the men waived
around a picture of a nude blonde wearing high heels and
holding a whip (Robinson was blonde and worked with a weld-
ing tool known as a "whip").65 One co-worker told a 'Joke"
about "boola-boola" (sodomous rape) and afterwards "teased
Robinson in a threatening fashion by yelling 'boola-boola' at her
in the parking lot."66 After these incidents, some male co-
workers nick-named Robinson "boola-boola."67 Another worker
objected to working with Robinson because of her sex and com-
mented "'women are only fit company for something that
howls,' and 'there's nothing worse than having to work around
women.'" ' Graffiti on the walls where Robinson worked includ-
ed "'lick me you whore dog bitch,' 'eat me,' and 'pussy."' 69
The harms of sexual harassment are similar, though not al-
ways identical, to those produced by racial harassment. At Jack-
sonville Shipyards, like the Murphy freight terminal or the Suf-
folk County jail, harassed employees often feared for their physi-
cal safety. Like those harassed on the basis of race, Robinson
and other women at the shipyard must often have found it very
difficult to perform well, given their fear, shame, embarrassment,
humiliation, and the feeling of being trapped. Robinson and
other women must often have felt invisible as individual human
beings and visible only as females because of the shape of their
'0 Id at 1498.
61 Id.
62 Id.
Id
64 jId
15 Id. at 1496.
6' Id. at 1499.
67 Id. at 1496.
' Id at 1498.
69 Id at 1499.
1996]
University of California, Davis
bodies. It seems likely that some or all of the women might also
have had to learn not to react sexually to such provocations,
complicating their ability to respond sexually in appropriate
situations.
Sexual harassment reinforces a message women are constantly
hearing in our culture: women are primarily sexual beings and
valuable to the extent their sexuality pleases men. Most women
first experience sexual harassment from peers in grade and high
school,"' when their self esteem also begins to drop relative to
that of their male peers.
As this suggests, sex is not a gender-neutral phenomenon in
contemporary American culture. Sex continues to be seen as
degrading to women and as scoring for men. Women, not men,
are either madonnas or whores, innocent virgins or sluts.7 A
workplace full of sex talk can therefore be a treacherous place
for a woman to walk. The problem here is not that sex talk is
offensive in some aesthetic sense or that women take offense
more readily than men do.72 The problem is that a sexually-
charged workplace is a different environment for women and
for men - just as the Murphy freight terminal and the Suffolk
County jail were quite different workplaces for European
Americans and African Americans - because of the quite
different messages members of various groups receive from such
messages.
Sexual harassment harms women in many ways. Trying to
figure out and control responses to sexual harassment wastes
time and energy. Although confrontation is the most effective
70 See Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, COMMISSION BY AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HIGHWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993) (describing widespread sexual harass-
ment by peers in grade and high school).
71 Jennifer E. Smith, Fine Tuning the Wrong Balance: Why the New Rule 412 Does Not Go
Far Enough to End Harassment in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 80
(1995) (arguing that societal inference that women are sexually available - whores -
relates to whether females are seen to welcome attention and harassment of males or not).
The implication is that a friendly woman invites harassment and attention from any man.
Id.
72 Kingsley Browne seems unable to see anything to sexual harassment claims other
than "offense," i.e. "that the work atmosphere did not change in response to the addition
of women (or minorities) to the environment" with the result that harassment charges arise
because of "conduct that appears harmless to men [but] may be offensive to women."
Browne, supra note 12, at 487.
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way of meeting harassment," few women use it, presumably
because of fear of worsening the harassment and because wom-
en are not socialized to be assertive, particularly in sexual situa-
tions.74  Many women are hurt economically by harassment.75
Some women choose jobs in order to avoid sexual harass-
ment.7" Women who experience sexual harassment often
quit." Many are fired.7" Those who left traditionally male
(higher-paying) blue-collar trades, such as fire fighting and ship
repairing, often went to "lower-paying, traditionally female jobs
or sought alternative [sic] work environments through self-em-
ployment or small, nonunion contractors."79
Women harassed on the job often experience not just de-
clines in work performance,"0 but also "loss of motivation, low-
ered job satisfaction, negative attitudes toward co-workers and
supervisors, high absenteeism and turnover, and a lowered sense
of confidence."'" Psychological problems do not end at the end
of the work day and are likely to include "anger, fright, guilt,
depression, anxiety, decreased self esteem, and . . . [increased]
inner turmoil outside work and lower life satisfaction general-
ly." 8
2
Thus, the problems caused by sexual harassment, similar to
the problems caused by racial harassment, are not simply that
some sensitive souls take offense. Both sorts of harassment have
the purpose and effect of putting a group, either a racial group
13 MARTHA A. LANGELAN, BACK OFF! HOW TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 96-113 (1993).
" See, e.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 83 (arguing that many women in male-dominated
fields feel it necessary to go along with harassment in order to keep performing their
duties and to keep their jobs).
75 See Hadfield, supra note 9, at 1151 (discussing economic effects of harassment).
71 SallyJ. Kaplan, Consequences of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 6 AFFILIA: J. WOMEN
& Soc. WORK 50, 55 (1991).
" In one study, 75% of harassed women quit. Id. at 54.
7' Another study reported that 45% of women harassed were fired and 22.7% had quit.
Id.
n See Crain, supra note 15, at 1923.
' James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women
Autoworkers, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 277 (1982) (stating declines in productivity
especially likely when those harassed are excluded from informal networks important to
success on job because of feedback or training or other kinds of support).
"' See Crain, supra note 15, at 1927.
'2 I& at 1928.
1996]
University of California, Davis
or women, back in their subordinate place and outside the eco-
nomic territory of the harassers. Neither the purpose nor the
effect is the communication of ideas. Nevertheless, in recent
years free speech claims have appeared as defenses in cases
involving sexual harassment. Although I have not heard of such
a defense in a racial harassment case, it is difficult to imagine
that the First Amendment issue could be resolved differently in
these two contexts. Rather, it seems likely that any First Amend-
ment limits to Title VII's ability to prohibit sexually harassing
speech will also limit its ability to prohibit racially harassing
speech.
C. The Slow Emergence of a Free Speech Defense in
Sexual Harassment Cases
Some commentators have argued that Title VII can reach
harassing speech directed at one or more particular individuals
but not generally harassing speech.8" But in the three cases de-
scribed in Part I,84 there is no clear line between directed and
non-directed speech. Consider, for example, in EEOC v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines,85 the sign "nigger lunchroom" put up in a
room where two African Americans ate lunch to avoid the racial
harassment in the main lunchroom. Is such speech directed? Or
consider, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,86 the picture
of the nude blond with a whip waived at Robinson, who was
blonde and worked with a welder's "whip," the graffiti (i.e. "eat
me") written in Robinson's work area, or the pornographic pic-
tures repeatedly put in Robinson's toolbox. If those were all
instances of speech directed against specific individuals, what of
the graffiti on the walls where Robinson worked ("'lick me you
whore dog bitch,' 'eat me,' and 'pussy'")? Where is the line
between directed and non-directed speech?
"s See Strossen, supra note 13 (stating Title VII is limited in application to specifically
directed speech and does not affect general harassing speech); Volokh, supra note 13
(same).
SSee Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (involving
sexual harassment); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (involving
racial harassment); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn.
1980) (involving racial harassment).
" 488 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D. Minn. 1980).
760 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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Initially, all participants seem to have assumed, regardless of
whether the setting was private" or public' employment, that
the First Amendment is not a defense to a sexual harassment
charge under Title VII. The two Supreme Court cases recogniz-
ing sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII assumed that
the First Amendment does not limit the scope of Title VII.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision striking down
Minneapolis' ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly
conduct, R.A.V v. City of St. Pau49 stated that Title ViI's ban
on sexual harassment is not a constitutional problem. Thus,
three Supreme Court cases in the last ten years suggest or state
that Title ViI's prohibition of sexual harassment in the
workplace is not limited by First Amendment concerns.9"
The first of these cases is Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.9
Meitor was the first case in which the Court ruled on a sexual
harassment claim. Although the claim at issue in that case was
quid pro quo - a supervisor requiring sex as a condition of
keeping a job - the Court quoted with approval the broad
definition of sexual harassment in the EEOC guidelines. That
definition included not just sexual advances and requests for
sex, but also "other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
" See, e.g., Waltman v. International Paper, 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989) (ruling on
sexual harassment suit against private employer without mention of First Amendment);
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1989) (same);Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993) (same); Barbetta v. Chemlawn, 669 F.
Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
's See, e.g., Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993) (ruling
on sexual harassment suit against public employer without mention of First Amendment);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,
864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (same);
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982) (same); Poulsen v. City of N.
Tonawanda, 811 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Sims v. Montgomery County, 766 F.
Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (same);Jen v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp 946 (S.D. Iowa
1990) (same); Sanchez v. Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (same);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp 1269 (D.D.C. 1988) (same); Arnold v. Seminole, 614 F.
Supp 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (same); Berkman v. New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (same); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 1980 WL 380 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (same).
"J 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
This position is supported by Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Woi*place:
What is it and How Should it be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 21 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 357, 414 (1995). Bums argues that Title VII is a legal critique of speech as
conduct that causes a discriminatory harm, instead of speech as such. Id.
9- 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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nature"12 when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.""3 Nothing in the decision suggested that the
Supreme Court was concerned about interpreting Title VII so as
to avoid a First Amendment violation.
In the second Supreme Court case, the Court did more than
assume that Title VII and the First Amendment were compati-
ble. RA.V. held that government cannot make all hate speech
criminal.94 But in dicta, the Court indicated expressly that Title
VII poses no First Amendment issues:
Another valid basis for according differential treatment to
even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that
the subclass happens to be associated with particular "second-
ary effects" of the speech, so that the regulation is "justified
without reference to the content of the . . speech . .. ."
Moreover, since words can in some circumstances violate laws
directed not against speech but against conduct (a law
against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy
the nation's defense secrets), a particular content-based sub-
category of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct
rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory
"fighting words," among other words, may produce a violation
of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimina-
tion in employment practices.9"
In this passage, the Court indicated expressly that content-based
discrimination in the application of Title VII's ban on conduct,
i.e. sex discrimination, would not violate the First Amendment
since the regulation is directed at the "secondary effects" of the
speech, sex discrimination in employment, rather than at the
speech itself.96
The third case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,97 was a hostile
environment case involving only speech. Hardy, the owner of
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (3) (1995)).
93 Id.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
9" See Burns, supra note 90, at 413 (arguing that hostile environment claim is not
speech regulation since remedy is directed at employer and is in response to hostile em-
ployment environment and not hostile statement by individual).
97 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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the company routinely made hostile and sexist remarks, often of
a sexual nature, to Harris, a woman employee:
Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of
other employees, "You're a woman, what do you know" and
"We need a man as the rental manager"; at least once, he
told her she was a "dumb ass woman." Again, in front of
others, he suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [Harris's] raise." Hardy occasionally asked
Harris and other female employees to get coins from his
front pants pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front
of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the
objects up. He made sexual innuendoes about [Harris's] and
other women's clothing.9"
After Harris complained, Hardy promised to stop. But thereaf-
ter, "[w]hile Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's
customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees,
'What did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday
night?"'
The Supreme Court held that Harris had stated a valid claim
of sexual harassment. The standard used by the Court was
whether there was an objectively hostile or abusive environment,
a standard consistent with that suggested earlier in Meritor.'"
And though the defendant raised the First Amendment as a
defense in its brief to the Court on the merits, the Supreme
Court did not even mention free speech restraints on the reach
of Title VII in such cases.
Whether the Supreme Court will view free speech issues as
even arising in Title VII cases is unclear in light of these cases,
particularly R.A. V. 01 In Meritor and Harris, the Court simply
said nothing about possible First Amendment concerns. In
R.A.V, however, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, invoked
the "incidental restraints" doctrine to explain why Title VI's ban
on sexual harassment is permissible."' Under this doctrine, at
least some laws explicitly directed at non-communicative activities
may have incidental effects on speech without rasing any free
91 Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
99 Id
9, See id. at 370 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
03 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
"0 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90.
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speech issues."°' At least arguably, Title VII's ban on harassing
speech might be viewed as only an incidental effect of its ban
on discriminatory conduct and hence does not even raise a free
speech issue, the result suggested by Justice Scalia's explanation,
quoted above, in R.A. V 104
The weakness in this approach, however, is uncertainty as to
when conduct regulation affecting speech does and does not fall
within the incidental effects doctrine.0 5 Two modem cases,
Roberts v. United States Jaycees"°6 and Board of Directors v. Rotary
International,0 7 raised First Amendment rights of private associ-
ation and of expressive association, in actions to enforce laws
forbidding sex discrimination in public accommodations. In
these two cases, the Court did not use the incidental effects
doctrine, though the state bans on sex discrimination in places
of public accommodation expressly regulated only conduct.
Instead, the Court stressed the compelling nature of the
government's interest in ending sex discrimination. 8 In Rob-
erts, the Court noted that the challenged state statute "protects
the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and person-
al harms."" The Court then explained the damage done by
sex discrimination: "[I]t . . .both deprives persons of their indi-
vidual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participa-
tion in political, economic, and cultural life."" 0 Finally, the
Court concluded that "[a]ssuring women equal access" to the
employment-related benefits of being members of the Jaycees
"clearly furthers compelling state interests."1
These cases suggest that speech concerns might arise in sexu-
al harassment cases under Title VII - rather than such cases
being free of First Amendment issues under the incidental ef-
0. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 105-08
(1987) (discussing incidental effects doctrine and criticizing four arguments in support of
doctrine).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90.
', Stone, supra note 103, at 105-06.
0 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
'0 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
'0 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (stating that eliminating discrimination serves state inter-
est); Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 549 (same).
" See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
11o Id.
I Id. at 626.
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fects doctrine - though they also indicate that any First Amend-
ment concern should be balanced against government's powerful
interest in ending race and sex discrimination in employ-
ment. 2  Moreover, the EEOC regulations on sexual harass-
ment, approved by the Court in Meritor," are not content-neu-
tral. Under the EEOC Guidelines, proscribed "conduct" includes
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual behaviors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."" 4
Furthermore, the government as employer often bans all por-
nography in its own workplace." 5 Such a ban cannot be re-
garded as content-neutral and hence cannot be immunized from
First Amendment analysis by the incidental effects doctrine. For
these reasons, it is at least highly doubtful that the incidental
effects doctrine can immunize Title VII's ban on sexual harass-
ment. I analyze the constitutionality of Title VII as though the
ban on harassing speech does raise free speech concerns.
Free speech issues have recently emerged in Title VII cases
and commentary. This development seems to be the result of
successful challenges to public university speech codes on First
Amendment grounds in two district court decisions." 6  Al-
though the codes were adopted pursuant to Title IX's ban on
"' For a case using similar balancing to uphold against a religious freedom challenge
the IRS's denial of charitable status to a racially-discriminatory religious university, see Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying university admission to appli-
cants married to person of another race or who advocated such marriages). In Bob Jones,
the Court stressed its "view that racial discrimination in education violates a most funda-
mental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals." Id, at 593. Even against the
asserted claim based on the right to free expression of religion, the Court found a "com-
pelling" and "fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in edu-
cation." Id. at 604. See also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2347 (1995) (holding unconstitutional state's requirement, under
non-discrimination in public accommodations statute, that openly lesbian-gay contingent be
allowed to march in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade because such requirement
impermissibly interferes with free speech rights of parade organizers); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
"' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
.. SeeJohnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (1994)
(describing fire department's ban on Playboy magazine); infra notes 136-47 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Johnson).
"' Balkin, supra note 10, at 423. These lower court decisions support this proposition:
UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v.
Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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discrimination in education, rather than Title VII's ban on dis-
crimination in employment, the decisions did suggest that the
need to eliminate discrimination might not make constitutional
all limits on speech in settings such as employment as well as
universities. Following these two district court decisions, a num-
ber of commentators and two trial courts in Title VII cases have
considered First Amendment issues in hostile environment cases.
Between Meritor and Harris, two lower federal courts struck
down university speech codes at public universities as unconstitu-
tional infringements on speech rights in high-publicity cases." 7
Defense lawyers in Title VII cases realized that the First Amend-
ment might limit the reach of bans on harassing language.11
There are now two district court decisions reaching the merits
of the constitutional issue in a Title VII case, one going each
way.
Most of the facts of the first case have already been described.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 19 the court issued a
broad injunction against pornography and harassing speech at
Jacksonville Shipyards. In addition to hearing the testimony of
Lois Robinson, the named plaintiff, the court heard testimony
from two female co-workers, though the incidents they described
occurred outside the filing period for Title VII claims." Rob-
inson testified about the widespread verbal harassment and dis-
plays of pornography, described earlier, as well as about the
"new wave of harassing behavior [including displays of "hard
.. UWM Post; 774 F. Supp. at 1163; Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852. See also Jeffries v.
Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) (ordering reinstatement of Black Studies professor
removed as department chair after controversial off-campus speech), vacated, 115 U.S. 502
(1994) (vacating in light of Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994)); Cony v. Stanford,
No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Feb. 27, 1995) (finding Stanford speech
code unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement because, although Stanford is private
school, state statute imposes federal constitutional limits on speech regulation by private
university); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) (issuing preliminary
injunction requiring state university to reinstate tenured professor pending outcome of suit
despite his use of gratuitous sexual language and metaphors in classroom); Bill Workman,
Hate Speech Ban Struck Down, S.F. CHRON., March 1, 1995, at A15 (describing California case
in which county judge struck Stanford's speech code under California "Leonard Law,"
which extended free speech clause of First Amendment to private schools).
"' See Balkin, supra note 10, at 423 (stating defense counsels believe that First Amend-
ment limits laws banning harassing speech).
... 760 F. Supp. 1486 (1991).
'1 Id. at 1499.
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pornography"] directed against her and other women" following
her complaints. 2' Two experts testified for plaintiff Robinson,
supporting her claim that the sexual harassment at Jacksonville
Shipyards was harmful to women.'
Two experts testified for defendants that the pornography at
the shipyard or similar pornography did not seriously offend
most women or adversely affect their psychological well be-
ing.12 Defendants also introduced evidence that women often
bought similar magazines and that similar conditions prevailed
at two other shipyards without any complaints being made by
the women workers.'24
Women in craft positions at Jacksonville Shipyards were "an
extreme rarity."'25  For example, in 1986, the shipyard em-
ployed 6 women and 846 men as skilled craft workers.'26 And,
as the Robinson court pointed out, "[s]hip repair work is a dan-
gerous profession."'27
The court in Robinson did not see the relief available under
Title VII as impeded by the First Amendment. The court noted
that the employer denied that it was expressing itself "through
the sexually-oriented pictures or the verbal harassment by its
employees."' In addition, the court regarded "the pictures
and verbal harassment [as] not protected speech because they
act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work
environment,"' citing in support Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees."3 In Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota stat-
SI Id. at 1514.
' Id. at 1502-07 (noting testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske and Ms. K.C. Wagner).
,21 Id. at 1507-09 (noting testimony of Dr. Donald Mosher and Dr. Joseph Scott).
124 Id. at 1509. Sarah Bums was critical of this approach in Issues in Workplace Sexual
Harassment Law and Related Social Science Research, 51 J. SOC. ISSuEs 193, 196-97 (1995).
Bums said that the focus on the reactions of women - asking why they did not complain,
why they appeared flattered, why they joked and participated in reciprocal slurs - tended
to introduce distortion of the victim's blame. Id.
" Robinsm, 760 F. Supp. at 1493.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1492.
'1" Id. at 1534.
' Id. at 1535. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (upholding local prohibition of sex discrimination in help-wanted
ads on ground that ads were not expressive speech of press but rather commercial speech
promoting illegally discriminatory economic activity).
o 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
1996] 839
University of California, Davis
ute banning sex discrimination against a First Amendment chal-
lenge by noting that "potentially expressive activities that pro-
duce special harms distinct from their communicative im-
pact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection."'' The
Robinson court also regarded (1) the regulation at issue as only a
time, place and manner restriction; 2 (2) the elimination of
discrimination against women as a compelling governmental
interest; 3 (3) women workers as a captive audience;"M and
(4) "the public employee speech cases as a supportive analo-
gy 135
In contrast to Robinson, in Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire
Department,ss the court held that firefighters could not consti-
tutionally be prohibited from reading Playboy and other sexually-
explicit magazines featuring females as sex objects while on duty
- during "down" time - at the fire station.' 7 At the time of
the trial, "only 11 women [were] employed as fire fighters" in
all of L.A. county.ss The first had been hired in 1983."s9
Prior to the department's 1992 banning of pornography from
fire stations, "magazines with pictures of nude women were
commonplace.""' Such magazines included Playboy, Penthouse,
Hustler Cheri, and Gallery. '' Following the 1992 ban, several
male employees sued for injunctive relief, arguing that the ban
violated their First Amendment rights.
151 Id.
" Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
Is, Id.
"s Id. at 1535-36.
"' Id. at 1536. The district court distinguished American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down Indianapolis ordinance providing certain reme-
dies for harms caused by pornography as First Amendment violation), aff d, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986).
"'O 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994). See also De Angelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Offi-
cers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995) (overturning jury finding of sexual harassment
where plaintiff alleged she was harassed in 10 anonymous columns over two and half year
period in police union's newsletter hostile to policewomen in general or herself in particu-
lar; court found isolated incidents insufficient basis for actionable harassment under Title
VII as statutory matter).
"' "Down" time is time a firefighter spends at the station for pay, but during which she
or he can relax or sleep if there is no fire. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438.
'" Id. at 1434.
13 1d.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Two women firefighters testified in support of the
department's ban on sexually-explicit material at work. One
testified that she found the magazines offensive and "that the
male firefighters often made lewd comments and gestures while
reading the magazines."14 The other testified that she too was
offended and described "the constant barrage of abusive and
suggestive remarks made by male fire fighters while reading
magazines with nude pictures."'
Two women fire fighters testified against the policy, asserting
that Playboy was not offensive and did "not make them feel in-
timidated or uncomfortable.""' Lisa Natale, Corporate Director
of Market Research at Playboy Enterprises, Inc., testified that
"on average, only 15% of Playboy magazine consists of nude
photographs." The Johnson court also noted that "Playboy is a
stanch advocate of equality for women" and has a woman as
president. 145
The court in Johnson found the fire department's ban on
pornography in fire stations unconstitutional. The court applied
the federal cases defining speech rights of public employees.
Public employees' speech is protected if on a matter of public
interest and if, on balance, the interest of government as em-
ployer in an efficient workplace is outweighed by the interest of
the employees in speaking. After characterizing firefighters' in-
terest in reading pornography on the job as very strong during
their "down" time - because they were generally allowed to do
what they wanted at the station during that time'46 - the
court concluded:
If defendants choose to impose a content-based regulation
on employees' speech, they must produce evidence that the
speech contributes directly to a sexually harassing environ-
ment. In the present case, they have simply failed to show
that plaintiffs quiet reading of Playboy contributes to such an
environment. 7
4 ld. at 1435.
143 Id.
I" Id.
145 Id.
46 Id. at 1437.
I4 d. at 1442.
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There are two groups of cases relevant to whether the Robin-
son and Johnson cases were rightly decided. The first group,
involves public employment, as in Johnson. The other group, like
Robinson, involves private employment. I begin with the Supreme
Court decisions determining the scope of private employees'
First Amendment rights.
II. FREE SPEECH AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Employees in the private sector enjoy no free speech rights,
either under the Constitution or under any statutory scheme.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects only
against state action and thus affords no protection when private
employers retaliate against private employees for speech. And
neither Tide VII nor any other statutory scheme protects private
employee's speech from retaliation.
In this section, I discuss three sets of cases permitting the
federal government to limit speech in private workplaces. The
first two sets arise under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The last set arises under antitrust law.
A. NLRA
The NLRA does protect some employee speech, but that
protection is quite limited. The NLRA protects "only employee
speech relating to the terms and conditions of employment.""
Ironically, under this rule, the more political the speech, in
terms of general public interest in an issue seen as political, the
less likely labor law is to protect it. Labor law protects all speech
about terms and conditions of employment at a certain
workplace, a matter the general public might regard as of little
interest and as not of "political" concern, but protected speech
does not, for example, include speech about the environmental
effects of employer policies.'49
"' Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and
Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 924
(1992) (emphasis added).
"" Id. at 938-41 (stating that employers have censored employee speech that employer
viewed as unselfish or unrelated to employment terms and conditions).
[Vol. 29:815842
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Employers are also free to fire employees for speech consid-
ered part of a "secondary boycott." " For example, employers
can fire employees without violating the NLRA for distributing
handbills making disparaging remarks about the quality of the
employer's television broadcasts.' And although the NLRA
gives employees the right to distribute union literature and solic-
it members on employers' premises, employers can prohibit such
solicitation during the working hours, in places frequented by
the public, or when solicitation would cause inefficiency.'52 Of-
ten state or federal labor law actually prohibits employee speech
defined in terms of content. For example, in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title),5 the Court upheld as
constitutional a provision of the federal labor law prohibiting
union picketing of a title insurance company not directly in-
volved in the original labor dispute. (The picketers urged con-
sumers to boycott the title company.)
Another set of labor cases allow the federal government to
limit speech of private employers, rather than of employees, and
these limits have been held constitutionally permissible by the
Supreme Court. Under the NLRA, employers are not allowed to
make certain kinds of statements to employees under union
campaigns. This content-specific provision of the NLRA prohibits
employers from expressing "any views, argument or opinion"
during a union election that communicates a "threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit" contingent upon the outcome of
the election. 54 In upholding this provision against a free
speech challenge brought by the employer in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., the Supreme Court explained that "an employer's
rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to
associate freely" under the NLRA.'55 And the Supreme Court
" When striking employees interfere with the business of an entity with whom their
employer does business, that interference is a secondary boycott. See NLRB v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953).
"' See id. (holding that employer did not violate NLRA by firing employee for
distributing disparaging handbills).
' See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (noting that
employers may prohibit solicitation during working hours).
' NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Tide), 447 U.S. 607
(1980).
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
' Id. at 575.
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struck that balance on the side of employees' rights to associate
in unions rather than employers' rights to describe the conse-
quences of unionization in a way that might discourage employ-
ees from voting for the union. The Court explained that "bal-
ancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the nec-
essary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to
pick up unintended implications of the latter that might be
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear."'56
B. Antitrust Law
Antitrust laws also prohibit secondary boycotts, even when
political, if motivated by individual gain. In Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n,'57 members of an or-
ganization of lawyers refused to represent indigent defendants in
criminal cases in an attempt to extract an increase in fees from
the legislature. The organization argued that the boycott was
political because it was "altruistic"; 158 it's purpose was to
improve the quality of representation afforded indigents.
Although the lawyers' organization argued that the boycott was
protected political activity speech under the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court held that the boycott could be enjoined as a
violation of the antitrust laws because the lawyers were seeking
economic gain.
Most American employees in the private sector are not in
unions, and employers are free to fire these employees for
speech at any time. The Constitution provides no protection, no
matter how political the speech or how biased the retaliation,
because there is no state action. Thus, private employers are
free to ban harassing language as broadly as they wish. Public-
sector employees are protected by the Free Speech Clause of the
Constitution, but such protection is quite narrow. The scope of
156 Id.
157 493 U.S. 411 (1990). See also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492 (1988) (upholding antitrust limits on manufacturer's ability to "conspire" to
prevent inclusion of certain substance in certain industry standards when those standards
were routinely adopted by state and local governments).
'" For an excellent criticism of the Court's categorization of speech in public employee
cases as either personal (if based on self interest) or political (if altruistic), though political
speech is often motivated by both factors, see Estlund, supra note 14.
[Vol. 29:815844
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protection for public employees is described in the next section.
Thereafter, this Article discusses what standard should apply
when government restricts speech in private employment to
prevent sexual and racial discrimination.
III. FREE SPEECH AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
When an adverse action is taken against a state or federal
governmental employee, three strands of Supreme Court cases
afford some protection under the First Amendment: the patron-
age cases, the Hatch Act cases, and the Pickering cases. In the
patronage cases, the Supreme Court held that only policy-mak-
ing public employees can be fired in order to replace them with
loyal patronage workers after an election has shifted local gov-
ernmental power. 59 Under the Hatch Act cases, public employ-
ers can broadly prohibit much political speech and activity by
public employees."6 And under the Pickering line of cases, pub-
lic employers can censor employee speech in viewpoint-specific
ways when speech causes inefficiency in governmental opera-
tions. 61
A. Patronage Cases
The patronage and Hatch Act cases arise in slightly different
settings than censorship of harassing speech, but both suggest
that the Supreme Court is likely to be tolerant of such censor-
ship in public employment. The patronage cases deal with rights
of political association in the absence of any evidence that the
disfavored association with the prior administration impedes
effective job performance in the present. In contrast, harassing
speech is censored because of its impact on the ability of others
to do their jobs effectively. Indeed, the policy-making exception
" See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (holding patronage practices
unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to further vital government interests); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (noting that patronage dismissals justified only if they
advanced governmental interest); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 371 (1976) (holding that
patronage dismissals are limited by other individual belief and association rights flowing
from First Amendment).
'6 See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text (describing Hatch Act cases).
161 See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (describing Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and its progeny).
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allows new officials to fire policy makers and replace them with
their own workers because of the possibility that "party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the public office involved." 1
6 2
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to employees'
rights of political association and found unconvincing arguments
that patronage replacements would be more efficient workers.
But the Court also found compelling the governmental interest
in policy-making employees committed to the new policies, and
therefore held that policy makers could be fired for patronage
reasons without case-by-case balancing under a strict scrutiny
standard.'63 The evidence that sexual and racial harassment im-
pedes the ability of those harassed to do their jobs is at least as
strong as the evidence that policy makers will do a more effec-
tive job when of the same party as their boss.
B. Hatch Act Cases
Under the Hatch Act and similar statutes at state and local
levels in some jurisdictions, federal and many state employees
are subject to severe but constitutional restrictions on their abili-
ty to engage in political speech and activity. Under the federal
Hatch Act, federal executive employees, the vast majority of
federal employees, and state or local employees engaged in
federally-financed activities are prohibited from engaging in
almost all political activities other than voting and expressing
their views in private. Thus, for example, they are prohibited
from soliciting votes on behalf of a candidate or endorsing or
opposing a candidate in a political ad or in campaign literature,
participating as a delegate in conventions, raising funds for a
candidate, holding any position within a party, and running for
office.' Many states have similar restrictions for state and lo-
cal employees not covered by the Hatch Act.'65
Twice the Hatch Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court,
most recently in United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers" in 1973. The Court regarded the
.62 Brant, 445 U.S. at 518.
6 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1994); 5 C.F.R. §§ 733-34 (1995).
EMERSON, supra note 14, at 584.
' 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The earlier case is United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
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broad Hatch Act restrictions as constitutional reform measures
"to prevent the political exploitation of government employees,
to improve efficiency of the service through maintenance of a
'merit' system, and to promote impartiality in government ad-
ministration. ""' As Emerson noted in 1970, "[a]ll of these ob-
jectives are open to attainment by other measures, the control
of expression being a supplementary shortcut."" In upholding
these drastic restrictions on political activity applicable to mil-
lions" of state and federal workers, the Court reasoned that
though a different balance might have been struck between the
interests of employees and of the government, "the balance
[Congress] struck is sustainable by the obviously important inter-
ests sought to be served by [the] ... Hatch Act." 17 Thus, the
Hatch Act cases permit broad restrictions on political speech by
governmental workers under a balancing test, like the balancing
test applied in the third set of cases, the set factually most like
those involving censorship of harassing speech.
C. Pickering Cases
For this third and most similar set of cases, the leading Su-
preme Court decision is Pickering v. Board of Education,17' in
which the Court considered the right of a teacher to write a
letter to a local newspaper concerning the Board of Education's
"recently proposed tax increase." 7  The letter was "critical of
the way in which the Board and the district superintendent of
schools had handled past proposals to raise new revenues." 173
The Court upheld the right of the employee to speak after
balancing "the interests of the teacher ... in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as
75 (1947).
" EMERSON, supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168 Id.
Id, (reporting 1966 estimate that eight million employees were covered).
' United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
564 (1973). Public employees in non policy-making positions have been protected from
discharge for belonging to the wrong political party when an election results in a party
change. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
171 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
I" Id. at 564.
13 Id
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an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees." The Court found that
"absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made
by [the employee], [his] right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for dismissal from public
employment."'74
In subsequent cases, the Court has been unwilling to support
the right of employees to speak when speech undermines inter-
nal departmental authority. For example, in Connick v. Myers,'75
the Court held that the district attorney could fire an assistant
district attorney who, after receiving a transfer to which she
objected, circulated a questionnaire to other assistant district
attorneys soliciting their views on the transfer policy, morale,
confidence in supervisors, the need for a grievance committee,
and pressure to work on political campaigns. The Court noted
that Connick, a district attorney, had not been engaged in pub-
lic debate or seeking to inform the public, but "gather[ing]
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superi-
ors." '76 The Court regarded all but one of her grievances as
matters of only private concern, and therefore her speech was
not protected by the First Amendment. The one issue of public
concern, in the Court's view, was whether the New Orleans
district attorneys were pressured to work on political campaigns.
The Court regarded this as of "limited First Amendment inter-
est." '77 Given the importance of good working relations and
the incompatibility of insubordination with such relations, the
Court upheld the District Attorney's decision to fire Connick,
despite the public interest in this aspect of her speech.
Similarly, in Waters v. Churchill,"8 the Court held that even
on matters of public concern, the government as employer has
substantial leeway in assessing the risks of disruption as a result
of speech. In this case, the parties disagreed as to what Chur-
chill said about her nursing job at a public hospital to a co-
worker during a break. According to the employer, she made
,14 Id. at 568, 574.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
17 Id. at 148.
,17 Id. at 154.
171 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
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"disruptive statements critical of her department and .. .superi-
ors. "'179 According to Churchill, she made "nondisruptive state-
ments critical of the hospital's 'cross-training' policy, which she
believed threatened patient care." is The Supreme Court re-
manded for a determination of whether Churchill was fired
because her superiors thought that she had made disruptive
criticisms of them or because they thought that she had made
nondisruptive criticisms of the cross-training policy.' The
Court also noted that government employers are free to react in
any way they desire to employee speech of purely private con-
cern.1
82
In only one post-Pickering case has the Court held that em-
ployee speech was protected - Rankin v. McPherson.8  In
Rankin, the Court held that a clerical employee in a county
sheriff's office could not be discharged for telling a co-worker,
after hearing of a failed attempt on the President's life, "if they
go for him [the President] again, I hope they get him." 8 ' In
holding this speech constitutionally protected, the Court noted
its private nature - i.e. made in a private conversation with one
other employee, though on a matter of public concern - and
that the employee was not involved in law enforcement but held
a purely clerical position."5
Thus, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. Rather, the
Court applied a balancing-of-interests analysis in the Pickering
"9 Id. at 1880.
18 Id.
" Id. at 1891.
812 Id. at 1890. Courts have held that public employee's complaints about sexual
harassment on the job are not of public concern. E.g., Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750 (11th
Cir. 1993); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Deremo v. Watkins,
939 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding compensation demands of those who say they were
sexually harassed are of no public interest). But see Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263
(5th Cir. 1992) (stating speech regarding reports of sexual harassment of great public
concern). Sexually harassing speech (calling women "bitch," "whore," and "hen") has been
held not to be of public interest. See Black v. City of Auburn, 857 F. Supp. 1540 (1994). But
constitutional right of public employee to free speech violated when he was fired for verbal
support of woman who alleged sex discrimination. See Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787 (7th
Cir. 1993).
' 483 U.S. 378 (1987). See also United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (striking ban on honoraria for federal employees).
" Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378.
1'5 Id.
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and Hatch Act cases. When a public employer bans harassing
speech, the question is whether the ban is constitutional given
these cases, not other kinds of cases in non-employment settings
where strict scrutiny is applied. Under a balancing test, finding a
basis for upholding public employer censorship of sexually ha-
rassing speech is easy.
D. Sexual Harassment and the Public Employee Cases
Given the scope of actionable sexual harassment under Title
VII - the plaintiff must show verbal harassment "severe or per-
vasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment" - a public employer policy prohibiting such
speech would be constitutional under the Pickering cases. Such a
policy promotes efficiency, creating an environment in which all
employees can work effectively. Nor is the censorship motivated
solely by the fact that co-workers' response is hostile. The cen-
sorship is motivated by the employer's desire to afford all em-
ployees, in as far as possible, a fair and pleasant environment in
which to work so as to maximize their performance. The cen-
sored speech would disrupt the workplace, not just by provoking
hostility, but by hurting women workers in ways likely to affect
their job performance. Even purely verbal abuse, and even when
such abuse is directed at women in general rather than at spe-
cific women, is hurtful in this way when the Harris standard is
met; it creates "an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment." 6
In the Pickering cases, the key question involves balancing the
rights of the employee to speak against the rights of the employ-
er to maintain an efficient and well-disciplined workplace. Noth-
ing in this set of cases, or the other cases discussed earlier in
this section regarding the patronage and Hatch Act cases, sug-
gest that the Supreme Court regards whether the speech is
"directed" or "non-directed" as key or even as relevant. Never-
theless, various commentators have suggested that only "direct-
ed" harassing speech, i.e. speech aimed at a particular individu-
al, rather than generally directed at a disfavored group such as
women or African Americans, can be constitutionally prohibited
"8 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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under Title VII. The Supreme Court could have held, for exam-
ple, that only speech directed overtly against a supervisor could
be constitutionally suppressed to maintain discipline and internal
efficiency. Instead, the Court in Connick v. Myers held that the
entire questionnaire could be censored although the questions
were not directed explicitly at the District Attorney.187 Indeed,
such a line would have been pointless and could not have ade-
quately served the District Attorney's interest in efficiency and
discipline, since even overtly "neutral" questions - how is mo-
rale - were in fact intended and understood as pointed. So
too, sexual and racial harassment are intended and understood
as pointed at women and racial groups, whether directed at
particular individuals or not. These cases also suggest that
speech disrupting the workplace can be censored by the govern-
ment as employer even if the censored speech is also disfavored
and even if the censoring is applied in content- and even view-
point-specific ways. Thus, it is true, the censored speech is offen-
sive to women workers and members of disfavored racial groups
because of its content."a But this is also true in a Pickering type
case, where a supervisor finds speech critical of her or his per-
formance and organization offensive, as in Connick v. Myers."9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court permitted the censorship.
It is also true that when a government employer censors
speech because it creates a hostile or abusive work environment,
the censorship is content-based. But all of the permissible regu-
lations of employee speech discussed in this section are content-
and even viewpoint-specific. A public employer has legitimate
interests in the content of an employee's speech, particularly on
the job, but even off the job to the extent it interferes with the
ability of an employee to effectively perform the job for which
she is being paid. This is illustrated by the Pickering cases, such
as Connick, upholding censorship of speech even on a matter of
public interest - whether employees were required to work on
campaigns - because disruptive and designed to collect
opinions critical of the District Attorney."9 Not everyone who
Connidt 461 U.S. at 154.
" See Browne, supra note 12, at 481.
onnick 461 U.S. at 141.
19* Id. at 149-50, 154.
1996]
University of California, Davis
said anything about the District Attorney's performance was
fired; only the woman who circulated a petition designed to
collect hostile viewpoints.
McMullen v. Carson,9' also illustrates this point with a power-
ful set of facts, though the case did not reach the Supreme
Court. A member of the county sheriff's office appeared on the
evening news and identified himself as a recruiter for the Ku
Klux Klan. In the past, relations between the sheriff's office and
the African American community had been severely strained and
distrustful. The sheriff fired the employee because of the likeli-
hood that the African American community "would categorically
distrust the sheriff's office if a known Klan member were per-
mitted to stay" in his clerical position in the office.'9 2 It would
be impossible for an employer to respond to such employee
speech without regard to its content and viewpoint. The content
and viewpoint are relevant to the employer's legitimate reasons
for regulating the speech.
Thus, the patronage, Hatch Act, and Pickering cases dealing
with First Amendment rights of public employees do not suggest
that sexually or racially harassing speech in public workplaces
can be prohibited without constitutional problems. In the pa-
tronage cases, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to hold
unconstitutional across-the-board patronage firing following an
election in which the party in power changed. The Court, how-
ever, upheld the ability of newly elected officials to replace poli-
cy-making employees without case-by-case strict scrutiny of wheth-
er that policy maker's replacement was a compelling governmen-
tal interest. In the Hatch Act cases, the Supreme Court allowed
legislators to place severe limitations on governmental
-9- 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985). McMullen suggests that had the Fifth Circuit actually
reached the merits of the First Amendment claim in De Angelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995), the First Amendment would not have limited
the state's ability, as employer, to discipline or fine workers for harassing off-duty speech.
In De Angelis, an anonymous column in the police union newsletter expressed hostility to
women officers and the plaintiff in particular. Id. at 592. The Fifth Circuit, without
discussing the Pickering standard, expressed concern about "the difficult question whether
Title VII may be violated by expressions of a opinion published in the.. . columns in the
Association's newsletter." Id. at 596. But in McMullen, the Eleventh Circuit applied Pickering
to uphold the firing of an employee for a single appearance on the evening news during
which the employee stated a pro-Klan political opinion. McMullen, 754 F.2d at 93940.
" McMullen, 754 F.2d at 939.
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employees' political activities and applied only a balancing test.
In the Pickering cases, the Court allowed governmental employers
to censor on the basis of content and viewpoint, namely speech
critical of those in charge and likely to cause inefficiency and
insubordination. In every set, the Supreme Court allowed
government to censor speech likely to be as disruptive as
sexually harassing speech actionable under Title VII, i.e. speech
that is not simply "offensive" but which creates "an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. " "'
IV. PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTORY REGULATION
Although the current cases defining the scope of public
employees' speech suggest that actionable sexual harassment
under Title VII can be censored by governmental employers,
these cases are not necessarily controlling with respect to the
constitutionality of Title VII requirements that private employers
censor such speech. When the state censors all speech in all
workplaces, private as well as public, different considerations are
present. The justification for such censorship cannot be the
state's need to operate government in an efficient manner. And
the impact of such regulation on speech will obviously be much
broader than when government regulates as employer in public
workplaces. It is, therefore, possible that a different constitution-
al standard might be appropriate, with the result that govern-
ment employers and private employers would operate under
different standards.
In this section, I consider whether government can and
should constitutionally require that private employers prohibit
harassing speech. I begin with the broad constitutional issues,
discussing first the constitutionality of such regulation under the
Supreme Court labor and antitrust cases described in Part II
and then under the lower court university speech code cases de-
scribed in this section. I conclude that the Supreme Court can
easily uphold Title VII's ban on sexual harassment against con-
stitutional challenge and then turn to the question of whether it
"9 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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should do so and I next consider this normative question. Final-
ly, I discuss the merits of a standard that would only require
employers to prohibit harassing speech directed at an individual,
concluding that such a limitation is inappropriate on either
constitutional or normative grounds.
A. Sexual Harassment and the Labor and Antitrust Cases
The labor and antitrust cases discussed in Part II suggest that
the Supreme Court is likely to use a balancing standard not
unlike that used in the public employees' free speech cases
under Pickering in considering the constitutionality of federal
regulation of racially or sexually harassing speech in private
employment under Title VII. As indicated earlier, a balancing
standard, not strict scrutiny, was used in the labor and antitrust
cases.
There are strong similarities between bans on sexual and
racial harassment and the labor and antitrust cases permitting
censorship in employment settings under a balancing standard.
Like the NLRA and antitrust law, Title VII limits on harassing
speech are designed to regulate economic relationships and to
ensure all Americans equal employment opportunities, not to
control what employees discuss on the job.
Similar to the labor law limitations on employers' speech
during election campaigns, harassing speech occurs when a
power differential is present and increased by the harassing
speech, just as an employer's power over employees is increased
by speech predicting dire consequences for unionization during
an election campaign. Like speech that arises during secondary
boycotts, when strikers picket those who do business with the
struck employer, harassing speech often carries with it an implic-
it threat of violence. Consumers who cross a secondary-boycott
picket line often feel the threat of violence as do those subject
to sexual and racial harassment, particularly in jobs, like
firefighters and craft workers in shipyards, involving hazardous
employment.
Like the NLRA restrictions on both employer and employee
speech and the antitrust prohibitions on speech, limits on sexu-
ally harassing speech in the workplace depend on content and
even viewpoint and are political in some sense. In NLRB v.
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Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title),194  for
example, the Supreme Court upheld an interpretation of the
NLRA'95 forbidding strikers from picketing buyers of their
employer's product to induce consumers to stop buying the
product. This rule, like Title VII's ban on sexual harassment, is
content- and even viewpoint-specific; speech inducing disruption
of the business of a non-party to a labor dispute is regulated,
but not all speech on that subject is regulated. The Court
nevertheless regarded the key question as whether the speech
would be likely to produce only an "incidental injury" to the
non-party's business, in which case an injunction would be
inappropriate, or whether the picketing could "reasonably...
be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial
loss."' 96 The Court viewed this question as one of statutory
interpretation, not constitutional limitations imposed by the First
Amendment.'97  Penalties for such impermissible secondary
boycotts are "severe: not only may secondary picketers be
enjoined from picketing, but they may be fired from their jobs
and sued for damages."198
Labor law censors employers' speech too in terms of content
and viewpoint. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 9 the Court up-
held the NLRA's regulation of employer speech during a union
election banning speech that contains a "threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit" for election of a union.' ° Al-
"' NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title), 447 U.S. 607
(1980).
"." National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994) (stating that it is "an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... to threaten, coerce, or restrain" someone
not party to labor dispute "where ... an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring (her or
him] to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer ... or to cease doing business with any other person").
'96 Harris, 447 U.S. at 614.
"' Id (citing portions of NLRB v. Servette, Inc. (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 46, 63-64, 72-73
(1964) that deal with issue as statutory).
'"' Crain, supra note 15, at 1985 (citing NLRA § 10(c) for proposition that employee
discharged for cause cannot be reinstated, § 10(a),(j) regarding availability of injunctions,
and § 302 discussing damages). See also Matter of Swan, 833 F. Supp. 794 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(upholding against First Amendment challenge disciplinary sanction imposed on defense
attorney for sexist remarks to assistant United States attorney), rev'd sub nom., United States
v. Wunsch, No. 93-50671, 1996 WL 275005 (9th Cir. May 24, 1996).
" 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See also Horton, supra note 16, at 422-24.
"0 National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994).
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though this regulation of political speech was also content-specif-
ic, the Court upheld it against a First Amendment challenge. In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "an employer's
rights [to free speech] cannot outweigh the equal rights of the
employees to associate freely" in a union.2°' The Court stressed
that "any balancing of those rights must take into account the
economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and
the necessary tendency of the former because of that relation-
ship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might
be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear."2"2 Un-
der such circumstances, the Court concluded that it was consti-
tutional to forbid an employer even to tell employees in all
honesty and good faith "'what he reasonably believes will be the
likely economic consequences of unionization,'" unless the pre-
diction is based on objective facts outside the employer's con-
trol. °3 Similarly, antitrust law prohibits some employment-relat-
ed speech, as described earlier. In Federal Trade Commission v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n,04 the Supreme Court upheld
an antitrust injunction restraining lawyers from asking other
lawyers to refuse to represent indigent defendants until fees
were increased.
Kingsley Browne has argued that Title VII's ban on harassing
speech has as its "primary purpose the limitation of 'offensive'
expression" whereas in the labor cases, the restrictions on em-
ployer speech were "incidental effects" of the regulation, not its
"primary purpose. " 20 Thus, according to Browne, "the fact re-
mains that the purpose of [Title VII] regulation is [unlike labor
law regulation of employer speech] to prohibit expression be-
cause of the ideology expressed." 2 6 But how does Browne
know that the "primary purpose" of the NLRA limits on employ-
er anti-union speech had nothing to do with the suppression of
a disfavored ideology - unions are bad? Or how does Browne
know that the "primary purpose" of Title VII's ban on racially
o Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617.
Id.
Id. at 619 (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967)).
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
"'s See Browne, supra note 12, at 515.
N6 Id.
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and sexually harassing speech is purely ideological, rather than
economic egalitarianism - to give all Americans equal
opportunities to earn a living? Indeed, what would one look at
to determine "the primary purpose" of vague legislation
interpreted by the courts to ban harassing speech or anti-union
employer speech during union elections? Surely a more honest
and realistic appraisal of these statutes would admit that in both,
speech is censored because of harm associated with it, harm that
is associated in each setting with a particular ideology. Nothing
meaningful can be said about the "primary purpose" of either
statute as interpreted by the federal courts.
Perhaps, it might be argued, the NLRA cases should be un-
derstood as arising during an earlier era, when the right of free
speech was less well-developed and the courts felt a greater
commitment to industrial peace than they might today. But the
employment-related antitrust cases and the public employee
cases are recent. Moreover, the public commitment to ending
discrimination on the basis of sex and race is also recent and as
strong as the earlier era's commitment to good labor-manage-
ment relations. But in the eighties, the Supreme Court showed a
similar commitment to ending discrimination on the basis of sex
and race in the three cases discussed above. 7 in which it re-
jected constitutional challenges to bans on sexual or racial dis-
crimination. In those cases, the Court stressed the compelling
nature of eradicating, for example, discrimination in the form of
business clubs, like the Rotary or Jaycees, open only to men.
There are equally compelling needs for laws prohibiting racial
and sexual harassment in the context of employment. Sexual
harassment often has the purpose and effect of keeping women
out of certain jobs, especially blue-collar jobs,"' while thus giv-
ing men an employment-related bonus at women's expense;
men can exercise their autonomy to demean women in ways they
themselves find sexually titillating and with the result that the
o See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
See Horton, supra note 16, at 414-15 (noting sexual harassment law has done least
for blue-collar women and number of women in such jobs remains low). On needs of blue
collar women, see Elvia R. Arriola, What's the Big Deal? Women in the New York City
Constnuction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21
(1990); Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment:
The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9 (1995).
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women are less likely to be effective economic competitors. °9
Sexual harassment is used to keep women out of male work
forces, just as employer threats or promises of benefits are used
to keep unions out during election campaigns - and for that
reason are illegal under the NLRA. When women invade male
economic territory, men respond with sexual harassment "to
manage ongoing male-female interactions according to accepted
sex status norms, and to maintain male dominance
occupationally and therefore economically, by intimidating,
discouraging, or precipitating removal of women from work."
2 1
B. Sexual Harassment in Public Employment and the
University Speech Code Cases
The lower federal courts have struck down public university
speech codes on the ground that such codes, which tend to ban
racial and sexual harassment, among other things, violate the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.21' Perhaps these
cases suggest constitutional limits on Title VII's ban on harass-
ment. I have criticized these results elsewhere2 12 on the ground
that universities are in the business of regulating speech and
seeing such regulation only in speech codes is inappropriate.
But even if one thinks the university speech code cases were
rightly decided by the lower federal courts, the employment
setting should be looked at under a different lens, as suggested
by the labor cases and others raising speech issues in public and
private employment and the many differences between workers
and university or college students.
Although students at a university campus are dependent on
the university for grades, they have greater freedom to speak
expressively because they are more autonomous - far less de-
' See, e.g., Bums, supra note 90, at 413-16 (arguing that employer who makes work
environment hostile to women by participating in or condoning abuse burdens female
employees' rights to equal employment, and should be restricted).
20 SANDRA S. TANGRI ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK: THREE EXPLANATORY
MODELS, IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS 89, 96 (Edmund Wall
ed., 1992).
21, See, e.g., UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) (challenging rule prohibiting use of racial epithets); Doe v. University of Mich.,
721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (challenging university's policy on discrimination).
212 Becker, supra note 1.
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pendent on the cooperation and support of those around them
- than workers while on the job in private employment, who
are subject not only to bad reviews but also loss of their liveli-
hoods. Further, students are not hired to do jobs that may be
incompatible with certain forms of speech. Students are also less
captive as an audience than workers in the sense that one need
not attend an institution of higher education to survive. Relative
to workers, students have much greater autonomy and are much
more likely to have the independence necessary to be able to
speak freely on campus or to avoid speech they do not wish to
hear.
The Supreme Court could, therefore, conclude that Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination in private employment raises no con-
stitutional difficulty. On the other hand, there being no set of
cases absolutely squarely on point, the Court could also write a
decision finding a governmental ban on sex discrimination un-
constitutional as applied to some or all such speech in private
work places. As a normative matter, what should the Court do?
C. Normative Analysis
Title VII should not be regarded as limited by the Free
Speech Clause for two related reasons, in addition to the
strength of the public interest in ending discrimination in em-
ployment and Supreme Court precedents supporting such regu-
lation. First, the private workplace is not an arena of autonomy
and free speech. Second, free speech in the workplace does not
mean free speech for workers independent of what the employ-
er will tolerate.
Private employment is an area of inherently limited autonomy
and, therefore, of limited free speech. Workers are dependents
hired to do a job, not so that the employer can subsidize their
soap boxes. Part of doing one's job means satisfying employers
and getting along with co-workers. Employees are inevitably
dependent on the good will of others in order to do, and keep,
their jobs. As dependents, they inevitably have less autonomy in
speaking, as in other aspects of their workday lives, than they do
in other settings, such as in their living rooms or in public fora.
Two related aspects of this dependency, this lack of autono-
my, bear stress. As noted earlier, workers are economically de-
pendent on employers. Continued employment is necessary for
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food, clothing, shelter, and often for medical insurance. Ha-
rassed employees are, therefore, a captive audience. In using this
term, I do not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court cases
previously using it2"' can be reconciled with other speech cases
or form a coherent body of case law. Rather, as Jack Balkin put
the point, the "employee working for low wages in a tight job
market who is sexually harassed by her employer or co-worker"
is a far more paradigmatic case of a captive audience than "pas-
sengers on the public buses [who may see advertisements they
would rather avoid] or the child running through stations on
the radio dial."21 2 Furthermore, allowing Title VII hostile envi-
ronment claims to proceed without constitutional limits draws a
clear and principled line that protects these vulnerable and
captive workers regardless of the difficulty of understanding the
Supreme Court's use of "captive audience" in other settings.
Even if other employment is available, it may be at lower pay or
entail loss of seniority or health insurance, particularly frighten-
ing for those with pre-existing medical conditions. Thus, the first
aspect of dependency is the great need workers have for jobs,
and the fact that those harassed are likely to be a truly captive
audience.
A second and related aspect of dependency in the workplace
has implications for free-speech analysis. The point of free
speech protection is to protect unpopular speakers from repres-
sive regulation through democratic processes. It is true that in
recent years, free speech has increasingly become conservative,
protecting the powerful.2 5 But society should not forget the
real purpose of free speech in a democracy: to protect those
"' See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding broadcast of obscenities to
captive audience was against FCC regulations); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1975) (permitting captive audience to exercise control over unwanted mail);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding city transit system ban on
political advertising did not violate Fourteenth Amendment because transit riders were
captive audience). But see Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 85, 88, 121 (1991) (stating captive audience argument is "riddled with
inconsistency and ambiguity.").
2" Balkin, supra note 10, at 424.
215 See, e.g., id. at 423 (stating that libertarian theory of First Amendment drifting
toward conservative social interests); Becker, supra note 1, at 987 (concluding that binding
judicial review is conservative); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech
Principe, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 935, 955 (1993) (concluding that economic conservatives
profit from conservative free speech).
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who need protection from the intolerance of the majority in-
creasing, hopefully, the net sum of individual autonomy and
free speech. Recognizing constitutional limits on Tide VII's ban
on hostile and abusive speech in private employment will not
protect the vulnerable in cases like Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc. and Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department.
women trying to enter traditionally white-male work places.216
Rather, the recognition of free speech limits on Title VII will
reinforce the hostility and intolerance of those who control the
political system and such workplaces: white men. Recognition of
free speech limits will increase the vulnerability of the women
and minorities who are stuck in a situation from which they
cannot just walk away. Recognition of free speech limits on Title
VII will silence these marginal workers.
Constitutional limits on Title VII's ability to censor hostile
and abusive speech at Jacksonville Shipyards are not likely to
yield a work place with greater free speech and individual
autonomy for all those interested in employment there. To be
sure, such limits will increase the free speech of those who,
along with management at the shipyard, enjoy pornography and
abusing women employees. But think of the many who are
uncomfortable in this heterosexually-charged atmosphere and
feeling anything but autonomous or able to express their
sexuality: gay men - pressured to join conversations they would
prefer to avoid or open themselves to harassment; lesbians -
pressured to pretend to be heterosexual in an atmosphere in
which to be heterosexual and a woman is to be degraded as an
object; and many, if not all women, facing an impossible double
bind - to play along in conversations they find demeaning and
frightening or face greater harassment and danger by refusing
to do so. Title VII's restrictions on harassing speech will yield a
workplace likely to enable more employees and potential
employees to be autonomous agents able to speak with relative
freedom than that produced by constitutional limits on Title VII.
Thus, for a number of reasons, the dependency of workers
argues against free-speech limits on Title VII.
"' See Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490-91, 1535 (M.D.
Fla. 1991);Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (1994).
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The point here is not that because workers are vulnerable,
they should not get any constitutional protection. Rather, there
is little point in enforcing constitutional limits on the ability of
Congress to prohibit sexual harassment under Title VII in order
to protect the speech of workers. Workplaces free of sexually and
racially harassing speech might well be workplaces with more,
not less, freedom of speech (and freedom not to speak) though
to be sure there would be differences in what is said and in
which employees feel free to speak and to be silent. In the
context of copyright law, the Supreme Court has recognized
that, sometimes, limits on free speech actually further real
speech and autonomy concerns: "Courts and commentators have
recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication in
particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value [in
freedom not to speak]."2"7 So too, Title VII's limits on
harassing speech actually further general free speech and
autonomy.
My second major argument against constitutional limits on
Title VII is that such limits will not actually mean free speech
rights for employees. Given private employers' freedom to fire
workers for disfavored speech, a First Amendment limitation on
Title VII will actually translate into a right for employers not
employees. The conflict is between the private employee's right
to the opportunity to work free of discrimination and the pri-
vate employer's right to control workplace speech."8 Recogni-
tion of constitutional limits on Title VII will protect only the
right of private employers to control the work force and its
speech.
There is no such thing as free speech in private employment.
Recall that in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., male pornog-
raphy was not displayed, and supervisors indicated they would
tear it down if they saw it.2" Similarly, management forbade
political posters in the shipyard. There was plenty of censorship
in the shipyard, though female pornography was tolerated and
enjoyed by many managers, as well as workers.
27 Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
238 See Horton, supra note 16, at 409.
23' Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1494.
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Kingsley Browne and Eugene Volokh have argued that the
workplace is where most workers engage in much of their politi-
cal speech." ° But unpopular views are not freely expressed at
work. In most workplaces, women worry about what they say lest
they be labeled "feminazi" and African Americans worry about
what they say lest they be labeled radical and anti-white. Most
gay men and lesbians are exceedingly careful about what the say
at work, and only the most foolish would "flaunt" their sexual
exploits the way many other employees do. I have tenure and
far more job security than most Americans, but I worry a great
deal about what I say at work on political issues, particularly
issues involving law school appointments and politics. Protecting
much racially or sexually harassing speech for this reason, as
Browne and Volokh apparently would, will not translate into
tolerance for feminists or Black nationalists. Indeed, it will mean
tolerance of harassing speech only to the extent tolerated by the
employer.
Constitutional limits on Tide VII will translate into freedom of
speech for employees only if and when and to the extent em-
ployers tolerate the speech Title VII cannot ban, i.e. only when
the employer permits the hostile and abusive speech. As we
move into the twenty-first century with its multicultural work
force, most of whom will not be white men, employers are in-
creasingly going to regulate this speech anyway for economic
reasons.2 ' There are already many workplaces which men who
would like to post porn feel that they are the silenced under-
dogs, and the number is likely to increase in the future, regard-
less of the reach of Title VII. This is not to say that there is no
longer any need for Title VII's ban on harassing speech. Em-
ployers are more conscious today than in the past of the dollar-
and-cents cost of sexual and racial harassment because Title VII
made it illegal. And not all employers are as yet committed to
eliminating such speech. Indeed, some employers such as Jack-
sonville Shipyards, employers with traditionally male or white
work forces, may view sexual and racial harassment as valuable,
tending to discourage entry of workers their current employees
n0 Browne, supra note 12, at 516; Volokh, supra note 13, at 1849.
221 For a discussion of the costs to business associated with sexual harassment, see
Kaplan, supra note 76.
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would resent and prefer to avoid. For such employers, Title VII's
ban on racial and sexual harassment is absolutely necessary if
employment opportunities are to be available to all regardless of
race or sex.
'If private employment is an important arena of free speech
on political issues, then we need to extend First Amendment
protection to private employment in general so that all people
with disfavored politics are entitled to speak as freely as those
with mainstream politics. 2  Employers routinely repress
disfavored political speech in workplace. Unless some kind of
limit on discrimination on the basis of speech in private employ-
ment is adopted by courts or legislature or constitutional amend-
ment, holding unconstitutional Title VII's ban on harassing
speech in private employment cannot protect employees' speech
rights. The Court should, therefore, uphold Title VII under the
relatively lenient balancing standard that it articulated in the
anti-trust cases and the labor cases, cases which also involved
speech in settings of private employment. Perhaps, however,
Title VII should ban only harassing speech directed at particular
individuals. I turn next to an analysis of this suggested distinc-
tion.
D. Directed Versus Non-Directed Speech
Nadine Strossen and Eugene Volokh suggested that only di-
rected speech should be actionable under Title VII without any
constitutional issue. 23 Under this approach, Title VII could
censor one worker yelling sexual or racial epithets at another.
But Title VII could not censor non-directed speech, such as
pornographic posters on the walls, because of First Amendment
constraints.2 24 Strossen and Volokh do not derive this "rule"
from the language of the First Amendment, as it does not give
guidance on when regulation of speech is and is not permissi-
ble. Nor has the Supreme Court articulated this "rule" in cases
dealing with restrictions on speech in public or private employ-
ment. None of these cases, discussed in Parts I and II above,
Lisa Bingham makes such an argument. See Bingham, supra note 15.
" See Strossen, supra note 13; Volokh, supra note 13.
" Strossen, supra note 13, at 777-78.
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suggests the line Strossen and Volokh would draw. Three possi-
bilities may explain the rule articulated by Strossen and Volkh.
First, perhaps this is based on a recognition that much
directed speech is already regulated and would be hard to
distinguish. Consider for example obscene phone calls, which
are regarded as constitutionally criminal and are directed
speech. But of course, government censors much more speech
than just obscene phone calls. The NLRA and antitrust cases,
discussed above, seem far more analogous.
A second possibility is based on the fact that perhaps the
NLRA cases permit regulation of speech because the speech
regulated explicitly or implicitly threatens violence or other
illegal action, as suggested earlier.225 Thus, perhaps injunctions
against union picketers in secondary boycotts are permitted
because of the implicit threat of violence to consumers and
other third parties who attempt to cross the picket line. Injunc-
tions against anti-union speech by employers in union elections
are perhaps permitted because of the implicit threat of illegal
retaliation against workers if they elect the union.
Perhaps harassing speech directed against particular employ-
ees similarly carries explicit or implicit threats of illegal action,
such as refusing to cooperate with the harassed co-worker, or to
show her the ropes, or to behave in other discriminatory ways,
or even of violence. This is true. But non-directed harassing
speech is similar when it creates a hostile or abusive environ-
ment. At Jacksonville Shipyards, a woman need not hear abusive
language directed at her as an individual to hear the threat
implicit in the pornography surrounding her that she will not
be treated as an individual worker, worthy of dignity and re-
spect, but as an object; that the men are not likely to be willing
to show her the ropes, help, and support her the way they
would one of the boys; and even that she should be careful
walking to her car at night alone in the shipyard parking lot,
because violence may be directed at her as well as the targeted
" This possible basis is suggested by Kent Greenawault's work on the First
Amendment, though he does not develop such points. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 257-58 (1989) (discussing possible sanctions as
response to privileged speech); Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. BAR. FOUND.
RES. J. 645.
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breast.226 Recall that a co worker yelled "boola-boola," a refer-
ence to sodomous rape, at Lois Robinson in the parking lot.
Finally, a third possibility may explain the Strossen position:
both our culture and the ACLU tend to focus on rights of indi-
viduals, not groups. Rights are seen primarily in terms of indi-
vidual rights. This is true even when talking about a ban on
discrimination on the basis of group membership like sex or
race. But this approach does not work well when analyzing
speech hostile or abusive on the basis of group membership.2 7
There is not much difference between directed and non-directed
speech hostile and abusive on this basis. Women and men, as
well as whites and people of color, understand this in the real
world. There is not much difference between epithets hurled at
an individual woman and pornographic pictures all over the
walls at work. An individual woman understands that she is a
woman, that those are women, and that those pictures indicate
how her co-workers look at women, including herself. In fact, in
both Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. and Johnson v. County
of Los Angeles Fire Department, the consumption of pornography
was associated with abuse directed at individual women. 8 I
suspect that this will often be the case.
Another problem with this directed and non-directed line is
that it would be very hard, if not impossible, to apply. How
would one decide whether speech is directed or non-directed
when it is harassing on the basis of sex or race, i.e. membership
in a group? Recall that in Robinson, plaintiff Lois Robinson was a
blond and a welder who worked with a welding instrument
known as a whip. 2 Once she was in a small enclosed area
with six or eight guys, no other women, and one of the guys
waved around a piece of pornography of a blond with a whip.
Would that be directed or non-directed? What if it were on a
wall in the men's locker room? On the wall near her locker?
Should the graffiti on the walls where Robinson worked be
considered directed or non-directed?
23 °
26 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
17 See Bums, supra note 124, at 196-97 (arguing that group-based stereotyping is more
pernicious and insidious on group members than disparagement not group-based).
22 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1494; Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F.
Supp. 1430, 1439 (1994).
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1496.
232 The graffiti where she worked included "'lick me you whore dog,' 'bitch,' 'eat me,'
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In terms of harm, the harm can be exactly the same whether
speech is directed or non-directed. In fact, a few mild directed
remarks would be much less harmful than pervasive non-directed
hostile or abusive speech. Nor can one distinguish between
directed and non-directed speech in terms of the purpose of the
harassing men. Both can be used to make women feel they are
not welcome in the workplace, to communicate the message that
they had best get out before they get hurt, particularly if it is a
traditionally male and hazardous workplace like the shipyards or
the fire station. Or they had best keep their place and be always
on guard if the harassment is coming from a supervisor as in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 2 1 Finally, note that Strossen's dis-
tinction doesn't eliminate the need for content and viewpoint
discrimination. Her line, too, is based on content and viewpoint,
since under it Title VII would ban hostile, but not friendly,
directed speech.
Richard Fallon has argued for two limitations to Title VII's
ban on harassing environments. First, speech which is "reason-
ably designed or intended to contribute to reasoned debate on
issues of public concern" should be constitutionally protect-
ed.32 Second, producers and purveyors of pornography should
not be subject to harassing environment claims involving the
material they produce and purvey.2 33 However, speech "reason-
ably designed or intended to contribute to reasoned debate" will
not meet the Supreme Court's harassment standard: speech that
is not simply "offensive" but which creates "an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment - an environment that a reason-
able person would find hostile or abusive."" s And women
working in the large pornographic industry should not, there-
fore, be unprotected from sex discrimination when it does occur
under this standard.
In this section, I have argued that Title VI's prohibition on
racially and sexually harassing speech should be and will be
and 'pussy.'" Id. at 1499.
'l 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
" See Fallon, supra note 4, at 47 (adapting from draft Guidelines Concerning Sexual
Harassment developed by Harvard Law School Committee on Sexual Harassment
Guidelines, which Fallon chaired, presented to Harvard Law School faculty in May 1994).
2" Id at 50.
231 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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regarded as constitutional by the Supreme Court. In similar
cases, the Court has indicated a willingness to allow economic
regulation even when overtly directed at speech expressing cer-
tain viewpoints. Equally important, the Court has indicated that
the government's interest in eliminating sexual and racial dis-
crimination from economic arenas is a compelling state interest.
Perhaps, however, the current understanding of the scope of
Title VII's restriction on sexual harassment contributes to per-
ceptions that women are victims and is actually inconsistent with
sexual equality. I turn to this final concern in the next section.
V. Too MUCH PROTECTION: WOMEN AS VICTIMS
Nadine Stossen has argued that equality concerns cut against
too much protection of women from sexual speech. She suggest-
ed that over-broad regulation of sexual speech in the workplace
would be analogous to protectionist legislation which applied
only to women workers. This in turn often limited their employ-
ment opportunities and hence hurt them. 35 So too, Strossen
suggested, "' [p]rotectionist' measures designed to shelter women
from sexually explicit expression ... in fact reflect and rein-
force a patronizing, paternalistic view of women's sexuality that
is inconsistent with women's full equality."" 6 Strossen ex-
pressed concern that limits on sexual harassment in the
workplace reflect "a concept of women's unique vulnerability to
speech about sex - and, indeed, to sex itself - that many
feminists find antithetical to gender equality."2 37 Strossen also
stressed the importance of broad protection for freedom of
expression for those committed to equality for women because
they advocate social change."
... Strossen, supra note 13, at 777-78.
" Id. at 778-79.
"' Id. at 780.
" Id. at 781.
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Strossen concluded by quoting from the "FACT briefs,"2"9
which described changes more important to women than regula-
tion of sexual speech:
[The] sex segregated wage labor market; systemic devaluation
of work traditionally done by women; sexist concepts of mar-
riage and family; inadequate income maintenance programs
for women unable to find wage work; lack of day care servic-
es and the premise that child care is an exclusively female
responsibility; barriers to reproductive freedom; and discrimi-
nation and segregation in education and athletics. 4 '
Strossen's analysis is, however, entirely conclusory24" ' and can-
not support her bottom line: that any regulation of workplace
harassment beyond the precise line she would draw - harassing
speech is actionable without constitutional violation if only if
targeted at specific workers - will hurt women's struggle for
equality. Every assertion she made about the dangers of banning
harassing speech for women could be made as easily about her
own proposal. Nor did she explore possible connections between
sexual speech derogatory of a woman or women and the items
on her approved priority list, such as the link between pornogra-
phy in male blue-collar workplaces and the continued segrega-
tion of women into lower paying women's jobs.
More generally, the line to be drawn between too little and
too much "protection" of anyone is inevitably a strategic one, to
be made in light not of armchair identification of the ideal line,
but of where the real world problems are, how well various
remedies work, and what advantages and disadvantages are asso-
ciated with them. Such questions are likely to be better ad-
dressed when the question is one of statutory interpretation, and
' L.e., the brief filed by feminists opposed to general regulation of pornography along
the lines of the proposals of Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. This brief was
filed in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnu4 771 F.2d 323, aff d mem., 475 U.S. 1001
(1986). The Seventh Circuit decision struck down such regulation as a violation of the First
Amendment. Neither the case nor the brief considered speech in the workplace or under
Tide VII. The brief itself is cited at the end of the material quoted in text. See infra note
240 and accompanying text.
2" Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amid Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Task
Force, et aL, in American Booksellers' Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 69 (1987-
1988).
21' See Horton, supra note 16 (providing less conclusory discussion of this issue).
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thus more easily adjusted, than of a constitutional line in the
sand.
Accusing feminists of reinforcing women's status as victims has
become increasingly popular of late. Any criticism of the status
quo or demand for change, particularly in sexual areas, can be
countered by the assertion that merely mentioning either prob-
lems or possible solutions only reinforces stereotypes of women's
weaknesses, ineffectiveness, vulnerability, and lack of agency as
sexual beings. But the alternative to complaining about prob-
lems and suggesting solutions is accepting the status quo, there-
by relinquishing any hope of attaining equality between the
sexes (unless we are already there). If there is any realm in
which we remain far from equality, it is surely the sexual realm,
where male aggression towards and objectification of women
continue to be seen simply as sex. Sex education continues to
teach - for overfly neutral reasons - about male sexual plea-
sure and female plumbing and pregnancy. Sexually active girls
in high school are still "sluts" and the boys they are intimate
with "score." Women are still either madonnas or whores. Sexual
double standards surround us. To pretend this is equality is to
give up on reducing the level of sexual inequality in the United
States today.2 4
2
If in fact women are not equal in employment today and
sexual harassment at work is one factor retarding women's eco-
nomic progress, we need to consider how to lessen such harass-
ment without inadvertently causing more harm than good. Asser-
tions that proposed solutions reinforce the stereotype of woman-
as-victim do not work in the necessary analysis of how to balance
these competing concerns, no matter which way one comes out
in the end on the merits. In a 1991 article, Amy Horton noted
that it seems unlikely that censoring hostile speech in working
environments so hostile as to be actionable under Title VII will
242 For a discussion of the different environments women and men experience when
sexuality pervades the workplace, see BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE (1985).
Gutek points out, for example, that "[bleing a sex object" is a "fairly central aspect" of the
female sex role while being a sex object does not seem to be central to the male sex role.
Id at 16. The central aspect of the male sex role would probably concern "sexual aggres-
siveness or assertiveness." Id.
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be overprotective or sanitize workplaces in a way oppressive to
both women and men.43
Part of the problem is that our culture tends to view individu-
als as either autonomous agents, entirely responsible for their
actions, or as helpless victims, battered by forces beyond their
control.2" We either act freely as a result of an individual
choice, or our behavior is controlled by our socialization and
the forces surrounding us. Reality is not, however, so simplistic.
Most of us are in part active agents influencing the world
around us and in part the beings created by our socialization
and responding to forces beyond our control.
For most workers, these points are particularly true on the
job; workers are both agents and subject to others' control. As
employees, they need cooperation, good will, and support not
just from their bosses, but from co-workers and often even sub-
ordinates if they are to be effective. At the same time, employ-
ees are not usually only passive victims without any influence on
the conditions of their employment or their relationships with
those with whom they work. And many employees, some men as
well as women, find themselves in environments in which sexual-
ly harassing speech creates problems too severe for them to
handle. In this Article, I have argued that the precise contours
of an employer's obligation to control such speech under Title
VII should be a question of statutory interpretation rather than
of constitutional limitations.
CONCLUSION
Free speech rights are effective only to the extent individuals
are autonomous - able to voice their views despite adverse
reactions. Autonomy will always vary with race, gender, and most
especially economic means, class. But there are fora in which it
is at least somewhat reasonable to assume that individuals are
autonomous: for instance, when an individual speaks in a public
... Horton, supra note 16, at 444-48.
... For an excellent discussion of the problem - that feminists are accused of reinforc-
ing women's status as victims when they describe and confront oppression - in the con-
text of domestic violence, see MARTHA MAHONEY, VICTIMIZATION OR OPPRESSION? WOMEN'S
LIvEs, VIOLENCE, AND AGENCY IN THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DIScOVERY
OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
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forum, in their own home, or at a political meeting. It is not
however, equally reasonable to assume autonomy on the job,
nor would such an assumption be likely to further free speech
and individual autonomy on the job. Few, other than federal
judges and tenured academics, are very autonomous as speakers
when on the job. And even these privileged workers are likely to
be quite careful of what they say and to whom at work. As an
employee, even the Surgeon General is dependent on continued
support from superiors and others if she is to be able to contin-
ue to hold and be effective in her job. Indeed, limits on harass-
ing speech will further autonomy for an otherwise captive audi-
ence who otherwise must try to work in an "objectively hostile
or abusive" environment.
Further, there is no reason to be particularly suspicious of
government when it regulates speech at work. Such regulation,
even of private employers, has long been tolerated under labor
law, with the purpose of achieving desired results in terms of
relationships between workers and employers. And although
labor laws afford some protection to employee speech, that
protection is quite limited. Labor law protects employee speech
about the terms and conditions of employment, but that protec-
tion does not reach even speech on these matters during work
hours and in work areas. And it certainly does not extend to
political sense in any broad sense. Indeed, labor law censors
much political speech, as described above. Congress and the
Court seem to agree that private employment is not an impor-
tant arena of free speech. Similarly, public employers are
allowed to regulate employee speech to achieve legitimate em-
ployment-related ends and smooth interpersonal relationships.
Public employees have a quite limited constitutional right to
speak even on matters of public interest: such speech is protect-
ed only when not disruptive of internal discipline and relation-
ships. For example, speech on a matter of public interest can be
restricted because of its disruptive effects when critical of a supe-
rior or of internal operations and procedures. Sexually harassing
speech is analogous. There are sound reasons for government to
censor such speech: to promote internal efficiency and smooth
relationships between co-workers - analogous to the desire to
ensure smooth relationships between supervisors and employees.
In the absence of such restrictions, sexually harassing speech will
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inevitably require supervisors either to tolerate inefficient rela-
tionships between co-workers or to waste time trying to foster
cooperation, respect, and self confidence in an environment in
which hostile and offensive speech continues.
Thus, government regulations of harassing speech - in the
form of a Title VII requirement that private employers limit
sexual and racial harassment on the job - are analogous to
constitutional labor law restrictions on speech of private employ-
ers during election campaigns, to constitutional restrictions on
the speech of public employees, to antitrust limits on employ-
ment-related speech, and should be regarded as one of the
many areas in which government is allowed to regulate
speech.245 The Article concludes that the First Amendment
does not forbid an interpretation of Title VII as requiring all
employers to restrict sexually and racially harassing speech.
245 Other areas include the following: slander, libel, breach of obligations of confidenti-
ality, obscenity, fraud, misrepresentation, threats to the life of the President, commercial
speech, contracts, antitrust, criminal conspiracy, public education, copyright, trademark,
giving secrets to enemies. See, e.g., THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 1, at 6-7 (listing some of
many areas in which we allow regulation of speech).
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